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PREFACE 
In many ways, the face of humanitarianism in conflict-affected countries is changing. This 
became apparent as the authors presented findings related to post-‘July War’ (2006) housing 
compensation and emergency risk reduction in Beirut in December 2008. The usual players 
were there – Norwegians, Italians and European Commission representatives – but so, too, 
were stewards of Kuwaiti and Saudi donor organizations and implementing agencies. Across 
the table was the director of a reportedly Iranian-supported humanitarian agency. The authors’ 
presentation showed that Arab Gulf states had provided more than US$580 million for the 
housing sector alone – and perhaps as much as $1.2 billion, when Iranian contributions were 
included – compared with $293 million for housing and temporary shelter from so-called 
‘traditional’ donors of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
A tide shift in donorship, at least in select environments, was under way. Yet, in 
Lebanon as elsewhere, no one could authoritatively describe what motivated this trend, how it 
affected the broader post-conflict community of scholars, policymakers and practitioners or 
what it meant for recipient governments and beneficiaries in war-torn nations. What economic, 
political and ideological interests or agendas were being pursued through these ‘humanitarian’ 
activities? Did Gulf state donorship represent a contest for regional influence or global 
prestige between powers and would-be powers within the region? What, exactly, were these 
funds financing, and how effective were the resulting interventions? Such questions, which are 
addressed to varying degrees in this paper, led to the emergence of this study. 
Caution, however, is due when addressing this seemingly ‘novel’ phenomenon. First, 
despite recent literature highlighting the rise of Gulf state contributions to post-conflict 
interventions, these countries have a centuries-old charitable record in at least West Asia and 
North Africa (WANA) and a decades-old history of formal, government engagement with 
relief, reconstruction and development. Second, Gulf state donors have, in many, although 
certainly not all, respects, extended practices established by their counterparts in North 
America and Europe. The motives and models applicable to some countries in the Gulf are 
seen in equal measure in Western donorship around the globe. This paper thus comprises an 
exploratory and analytical rather than necessarily comparative project. It aims to elucidate the 
growing trend of Gulf state donorship to conflict-affected environments rather than necessarily 
to outline in detail whether and how this is different from the heterogeneous approaches taken 
by Western institutions of the OECD-DAC. 
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Abstract 
Donors from particular Gulf states emerged as significant sponsors of mid-conflict and 
post-conflict humanitarian interventions during the Bosnian conflict of the mid-1990s 
and have grown increasingly visible, particularly during the past decade. This paper 
addresses the objectives underlying Gulf states’ contributions in conflict-affected 
environments, the tangible forms which Gulf assistance takes and the impact it has had 
both on war-torn contexts and on global conventions related to donorship. The authors 
conclude that Gulf state aid has been motivated by religiously rooted principles of 
charitable giving which have frequently been moulded according to, in particular, the 
national political objectives of donor countries. However, rather than being a solely 
strategic undertaking, Gulf state donorship also reflects principled positions related to 
human security, cultural integrity and state sovereignty. This study shows that there is a 
possibility of strengthening these ‘emerging’ donors’ activities while also applying their 
values and, at times, innovative practices to the so-called ‘traditional’ donors of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Planning for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip following the conflict in late 2008 and early 
2009 between Israel and Hamas included a bold statement from many Gulf states. Pledging 
US$1.65 billion, an amount twice that offered by the United States and the European Union 
combined, a small number of oil-rich countries signalled their intention to take the lead in 
rebuilding their own backyard (Arab Times 2009: 9). In announcing his country’s intention to 
provide the people of Gaza with US$1 billion, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) stated, ‘[A]llow me to announce on behalf of all of us that 
we have passed over our division and that we have opened the door for an Arab fraternity and 
unity for all Arabs with no exception or reservation and that we will face the future renouncing 
our differences as one solid cemented structure, holding fast to the Holy verse “Fall into no 
dispute, Lest ye lose heart and your power depart”’ (Royal Saudi Embassy 2009). While 
                                                 
* The authors are grateful to Professor Mary Kaldor and Professor David Held for commissioning this research. 
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Tim Heath of the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Of particular importance was input 
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acknowledge the many donor representatives and government officials in and from Lebanon, Yemen, Qatar, the 
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diplomatic rhetoric and policy frequently differ, such allusions to both intra-Palestinian 
divisions and broader regional animosities suggested the short-lived optimism that 
reconstruction could rebuild fraught political relationships in addition to roads and buildings. 
Commentators quickly responded, some with praise, some with incredulity and others 
with hope (Al Arabiya 2009). There was, in particular, a sense of optimism that, after the 
problem-riddled Western-led reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Islamic countries 
would provide a new and more culturally appropriate model of assistance.1 Yet little enquiry 
has since been conducted into the impact of Gulf state humanitarian and reconstruction 
funding, not only in Gaza but also elsewhere. Furthermore, the existing literature on Gulf state 
donorship has thus far failed to distinguish between those contributions made to stable as 
opposed to so-called ‘fragile’ or war-torn contexts. This paper takes up that issue and 
examines the role of Gulf state donors, particularly KSA, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and Qatar, in humanitarian or reconstruction-orientated interventions in post-conflict 
and conflict-affected environments. The authors ask: what are the defining and unique features 
of Gulf state donorship to conflict-affected and post-conflict environments with regard to 
motives, modalities (means of delivering assistance), programming and alignment with 
international conventions on aid effectiveness? The goal of this enquiry is not solely to 
understand the motives behind patterns of official development assistance (ODA) from the 
Gulf states and other countries, as scholars have sought to do in the past (see Alesina and 
Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003a; Villanger 2007), but also to investigate the delivery and 
implementation of assistance. As research into post-conflict reconstruction has shown,  
the modalities of aid financing, the application of donor conditionalities, the design of 
programmes and the imposition of monitoring and accountability mechanisms are fundamental 
in determining the impact and effectiveness of aid. In other words, the ‘how’ is frequently as 
important as the ‘how much’ (Barakat 2009; Barakat and Zyck 2009a). 
The next section of the paper outlines the existing research concerning Gulf states’ 
development assistance since the 1970s, with a particular focus on who does what, where and 
why. In doing so, it will provide an introduction to the architecture and key features of Gulf 
state assistance – though not specifically in conflict-affected contexts – before analysing how 
these practices are likely to have been influenced by a variety of contextual developments such 
                                                 
1 This relationship between cultural proximity and aid effectiveness was notably put forward by Arne Strand 
(1998). He argues that an organization with a cultural background similar to its beneficiary population will be 
more effective in designing and delivering assistance. 
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as globalization, the post-9/11 global ‘war on terror’ and the establishment of post-conflict 
intervention as a distinct academic, professional and policy arena. This examination involves 
the analysis of case studies of the following contexts: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Case study selection, while explained in 
greater detail later in this paper, is based on the volume of Gulf state assistance, the occurrence 
of a large-scale (>1,000 fatalities) and a clearly time-bounded conflict or phase of conflict and 
the commencement of specific reconstruction or recovery activities as a result of that conflict. 
The final section of the paper builds on these case studies in order to address their implications 
for the activities of Gulf state donor institutions.  
1.1. Terminology and scope 
‘Gulf state donorship’, a term used throughout this paper, could be taken to include bilateral 
and multilateral ODA as well as private contributions to foundations or zakat (charity) funds 
(see Ibrahim and Sherif 2009).2 Indeed, the rulers and populations in the Gulf have been 
particularly active in charitable giving outside formal, state-controlled channels. For the 
purpose of this paper, only state-led donorship has been included. So-called ‘unofficial’ 
contributions from the Gulf states or transfers intended to benefit recipients’ security services 
– in the interest of regional or cross-border security – have also been excluded, given the fact 
that they are unrecorded, unverifiable and distinct from the more ‘humanitarian’ or 
reconstruction-oriented financing with which this paper deals. 
Furthermore, the authors found themselves required to narrow the number of donor 
countries included within the study. ‘Gulf states’ could be understood as including all Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) members – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, KSA and the UAE – 
as well as Iraq and Iran. In designing this project, the authors decided to focus, as have 
previous studies, on those Arab Gulf states with significant international assistance 
programmes. According to recent studies of non-DAC donorship (see Cotterrell and Harmer 
2005), Bahrain and Oman are very minor humanitarian donors relative to KSA, Kuwait, Qatar 
and the UAE, which are included in this study and which have provided an average of 90 per 
                                                 
2 Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, obliges individuals to make an annual donation of a small portion of their 
wealth to the needy, and motivates both large-scale charitable giving by Arab philanthropists such as the Dubai-
based Makhtoum Foundation and small-scale donations to vulnerable individuals. Yet despite its sizeable 
contribution to total aid receipts in the Gulf states – the Emirates Red Crescent Society estimates that the most 
recent Ramadan campaign generated more than US$31.5 million in the UAE alone (Harper 2009)  – there is no 
reliable information regarding the amounts or the uses to which such contributions are put within or beyond the 
Gulf states. This being the case, the authors focus strictly on ODA except where otherwise specified. 
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cent of all Arab aid financing since 1970 (Van den Boogaerde 1991: 4). The UN’s Financial 
Tracking Service – which collects information on bilateral contributions as well as 
government assistance to and through the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
Red Cross and Red Crescent societies – indicates no bilateral or multilateral contributions 
from Bahrain and only US$30,000 from Oman (to neighbouring Yemen for post-flood relief).3 
While Bahrain contributed US$3 million to the West Bank and Gaza following the Second 
Intifada, this amount pales in comparison to KSA’s US$200 million or Qatar’s US$50 million 
(Saman 2003). While these countries may contribute unrecorded funds for humanitarian or 
developmental activities, they cannot be considered major donors from a global or regional 
perspective, a fact which is understandable given their relatively limited supplies of oil. Oman, 
for instance, has barely 2 per cent of the crude oil stocks of KSA, and Bahrain’s proved stocks 
are roughly equivalent to those of France or Cuba (CIA 2009). Iran, a country which has 
funded sizable humanitarian, reconstruction and development operations abroad, has also been 
excluded, due not to its level of giving – which likely rivals, if not exceeds, that of KSA, 
Kuwait and others – but to the lack of publicly disclosed records pertaining to its ODA, which 
has been provided through non-state actors such as the Shia Islamist political and paramilitary 
organisation Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Further study is, however, 
needed in order to better understand Iran’s crucial though under-documented contribution to 
relief, reconstruction and development in stable as well as conflict-affected contexts. 
On a final point of terminology, this article will periodically refer to ‘post-conflict 
reconstruction’; however, it must be recognized that the conflicts in which Gulf states have 
been most involved – in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories – 
may be described as protracted, unresolved and, in some cases, vigorously ongoing (Barakat 
2005a). In other cases, particularly in Afghanistan, what is occurring is not reconstruction in 
any genuine sense but rather initial construction of a more modern infrastructure and system of 
public administration and service delivery (see, for instance, Rubin, Hamidzada and Stoddard 
2003). The authors have thus selected the term ‘assistance to conflict-affected environments’ 
to reflect the situations which we are discussing and to highlight the paper’s inclusion of 
activities at every point along the relief–recovery–development continuum. 
                                                 
3 UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/, accessed 1 July 2009. 
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1.2. Sources of information 
Prior to and in the process of conducting research for this paper, the authors interviewed and 
consulted representatives of Gulf state donor institutions. These include officials from the 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), the Saudi Popular Committee for 
Lebanese Relief and the Qatar Foundation. A number of government agencies and non-
governmental bodies which had collaborated with these institutions were also included in this 
study. These include leadership of the Doha-based NGO Reach Out to Asia (ROTA), Iraqi 
officials, Afghan representatives of the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development, 
Yemeni figures from the Sa’ada Reconstruction Fund, the former head of the Palestinian 
Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), the Palestinian Minister 
of Public Works and Housing, and leading Lebanese officials from the High Relief 
Commission, Council of the South and Council for Development and Reconstruction. 
Practitioners from international organizations working in conflict-affected countries,  
including Islamic Relief, the United Nations and the Norwegian Refugee Council, have also 
been consulted. During subsequent phases of this research, the findings established in this 
paper have been presented to and reflected on by relevant individuals participating in a 
‘Reconstruction and Recovery Expert Consultation’ organized by the West Asia–North Africa 
(WANA) Forum, the Amman-based Regional Human Security Centre (RHSC) and the 
University of York’s Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) in Amman in 
October 2009. This event provided an opportunity to gain feedback on initial findings while 
also allowing the authors to capture the impressions of senior government officials and high-
level diplomats working in case-study countries on their engagement with Gulf state donor 
institutions (WANA Forum 2009). 
1.2.1. Data-related challenges 
One of the greatest challenges for this enquiry is the dearth of available data concerning Gulf 
state contributions and the programmes they support. As such, this study builds on a 
combination of data sources. In addition to the academic literature concerning donorship and 
the role of Gulf states, the authors relied on reports from international organizations, including 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UN agencies, and from Gulf state 
donor agencies themselves. Periodicals were particularly beneficial in charting aid pledges by 
Gulf states following crises in places such as Afghanistan since 2001 or the Gaza Strip in 
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2009.4 Such sources, however, tend to emphasize pledges and pronouncements rather than 
actual contributions and interventions. By the time donors were preparing to commit and 
disburse funds, popular and media attention had drifted elsewhere, thus complicating efforts to 
understand what amounts and forms of assistance had truly been received by populations and 
governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and elsewhere. 
Sources of quantitative data concerning commitments and disbursements, while 
inclusive of selected Gulf states, often include only partial information. For instance, the 
OECD’s statistical database keeps detailed information on both DAC and non-DAC member 
countries.5 Donor data for the Gulf states is, however, amalgamated under the heading of 
‘Arab States’ – inclusive of KSA, Kuwait and the UAE – and cannot be disaggregated by 
country.6 The OECD’s additional databases, particularly the Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS), do not provide data on non-DAC donors. Finally, the aforementioned Financial 
Tracking Service operated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
(OCHA) provides an alternative source with donor-specific data. Information is broken down 
by year and, at times, sector, and a rudimentary outline of only five to ten words of activities 
or use of the assistance is provided alongside the majority of contributions. However, the 
voluntary nature of this system, which overwhelmingly focuses on post-crisis relief assistance 
rather than longer-term reconstruction or development financing, means that it is used only 
sporadically by donor organizations, and the veracity of the data is difficult to assess, given 
that a contribution may be recorded either by the donor, by the recipient or by a third party.7 
Due caution should thus be applied when assessing the completeness of quantitative data 
included in this paper; figures provided may be understood as best possible approximations. 
The issue of data paucity is one the most common concerns among those studying Gulf 
state donorship throughout the past three decades (UNESCWA 2007; Hamid 2009). Indeed, as 
a result, ‘developing statistical capacities’ and sharing information regarding activities and 
                                                 
4 The authors do not intend to suggest that crises in these contexts are limited to these periods. 
5 OECD, ‘Stats’ Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, available at http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. 
The DAC, as of 2009, comprises the Commission of the European Communities and the following twenty-two 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
6 Aside from the exclusion of Qatar, this definition conforms to those Gulf states which are addressed within this 
paper. 
7 UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/, accessed 1 July 2009. This online database 
permits all users to ‘to report a humanitarian contribution straight to FTS’ without verification. As such, this 
system likely misses some contributions while, potentially, including assistance which may not have been 
delivered in full. 
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‘aid statistics’ were identified as key priorities during the 2009 meeting between Gulf state 
donors (‘Coordination Group Institutions’) and the OECD-DAC (Al-Hamad and Deutscher 
2009).8 Beyond the lack of objective and trustworthy quantitative data regarding Gulf state 
contributions, even less is known about the use of funds provided by KSA, Kuwait, the UAE 
and Qatar. Donor reports often break information down by generic sector, although specific 
activities are only highlighted as part of public relations-oriented exemplars. Despite 
contributions of more than US$300 million from Kuwait to Lebanon following the 2006 ‘July 
War’, no information about the transfers is available from Kuwaiti government sources or the 
Kuwait Fund. Governments receiving bilateral assistance from KSA, Kuwait, the UAE or 
Qatar provide little in the way of public aid-tracking, and multilateral recipients, such as the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) or national Red Crescent societies, tend 
to use consolidated appeals processes (CAPs) or trust-fund mechanisms which discourage or 
disallow donor earmarking for specific priorities. The only way to know what Gulf state 
donors have done is to engage in an epidemiological study of their funds, tracing 
disbursements from Gulf states to recipient institutions and, in some instances, individuals. 
While the authors have been able to engage in this sort of study in post-July War (2006) 
southern Lebanon (Barakat and Zyck 2008), in-depth aid-tracking in other contexts remains  
an open but challenging avenue for future research. 
2. GULF STATE DONORSHIP: A REVIEW 
Despite a tendency to perceive Gulf state donorship as a novel trend (see, e.g., Manning 2006), 
the region has a long history of international cooperation and development assistance (Figure 
1). In 1980, during a period of high oil prices, ODA from KSA was more than three times that 
provided by the United Kingdom globally (Porter 1986: 46). Even before then, in the period 
1974–9, aid contributions from Qatar, Kuwait, KSA and the UAE equalled between 6 and 8 
per cent of their respective gross national incomes (GNI), while DAC countries’ aid 
contributions accounted for only one third of 1 per cent (Neumayer 2004: 11). These 
contributions were provided in the form of both project aid, such as the $36 million loaned to 
Morocco by KSA for the construction of the Al Massira dam in 1974, and budget support, 
with over $100 million provided in this period to Morocco’s National Development Bank by 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that, while development statistics have increasingly become centralized, the decision to 
exchange even basic sets of statistics regarding ODA has remained such an area of contention that it was noted as 
one of six key action points – alongside high-level priorities related to donor coordination – at the 2009 meeting 
between OECD-DAC donors and the Arab Gulf states (Al-Hamad and Deutscher 2009: 6). 
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Figure 1.  Average Annual OECD-DAC and Gulf State ODA, 1970–2007 
Source: OECD ‘Stats’, Query Wizard on International Development Statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. 
Note. Information in this figure is provided by OECD (2009). Note that ‘Gulf States, Multilateral’ refers only to 
OFID, BADEA, and the IsDB, the three ‘Arab agencies’ which report data to the OECD (OECD 2008a). 
 
Kuwait, the UAE and KSA (Lawton 1979a). What is new, however, is a tendency for the 
globalization of information and news coverage to disseminate rapidly information regarding 
aid pledges, which often are presented as (and amount to) competitions of goodwill between 
prominent or would-be prominent countries (Hamieh and Mac Ginty 2009). 
As Figure 1 indicates, the present time should not necessarily be considered the height 
of Gulf state donorship. In 1978, KSA, Kuwait and UAE contributed funds which equalled up 
to 40.3 per cent of that provided by OECD-DAC member states.9 However, in the following 
two decades, OECD-DAC contributions continued to grow, whereas Gulf state financing 
significantly declined in both relative and real terms. By 2003, with reconstruction under way 
in Afghanistan and humanitarian aid flowing to post-invasion Iraq, KSA, Kuwait and the UAE 
 
                                                 
9 OECD, ‘Stats’ Query Wizard. 
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Figure 2. OECD-DAC and Gulf state ODA, 1970–2007 
contributed, through multilateral as well as bilateral channels, only 4.8 per cent as much 
development assistance as OECD-DAC members (Figure 2). 
The following subsection attempts to move beyond such quantitative figures by 
providing a brief overview of Gulf state donorship focused on their humanitarian institutions 
and record of international assistance, with particular reference to those factors which 
determine recipient selection. One approach to such an analysis involves the overlaying of 
major historical events and aid contributions in order to note correlations and the influence of 
economic and political crises. For instance, the surge in Gulf aid in the mid-1970s to early 
1980s highlighted in Figure 2 correlates closely with rising crude oil prices. Likewise, the fall 
in ODA from the Gulf states in the mid- to late-1980s may be viewed in the context of the 
cessation of annual payments of US$3.5 billion which had been provided by Arab countries 
since the 1978 Baghdad Agreement to Jordan, Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(Haldane 1990). Finally, the sharp rise in 1990 reflected a quadrupling of aid from the region 
in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which was facilitated by the simultaneous and 
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closely related jump in crude oil prices (Villanger 2007).10 As the subsections below suggest, 
numerous other factors were also at play in driving and determining Gulf state ODA. 
2.1. Institutions 
As in DAC member countries, ODA from the Gulf has been channelled through an increasing 
array of bilateral and multilateral channels. Kuwait, the UAE and KSA remain the only Gulf 
states with formal, fully governmental donor agencies (Neumayer 2003b, 2004). Among these, 
the Kuwait Fund, founded shortly following Kuwait’s independence in 1961, expanded on  
an earlier programme of support for Oman, Bahrain, North and South Yemen and the Trucial 
States (Porter 1986: 45). The UAE followed afterwards with the similarly named Abu Dhabi 
Fund for Arab Economic Development, which has since been relabelled the Abu Dhabi  
Fund for Development (ADFD). The Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) came next, in  
1974 (El Mallakh 1982). 
These three agencies or funds have been joined by numerous quasi-non-governmental 
and ad hoc donor institutions which, while formally private, disburse assistance from and in 
the name of the state. Qatar notably provides assistance through direct financial transfers 
rather than employing an intermediary governmental agency, although its non-governmental 
Qatar Foundation appears, according to Qatari officials, poised to take on the role played by 
humanitarian funds in the other Gulf states. Despite its lack of a recognizable government 
organ overseeing ODA, Qatar was the fourth largest non-DAC donor in 2003, after KSA, 
Kuwait and South Korea, and the twenty-fifth most significant overall (Cotterrell and Harmer 
2005: 17). Other Gulf states and Arab countries have employed similar mechanisms for 
disbursing ODA.11 
A significant portion of Gulf state assistance has been provided through the Kuwait 
Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund, the SFD and the Qatari government. While the Kuwait Fund  
had only a minimal role in Kuwait’s overseas development activities in the early stages – 
distributing only 2.6 per cent of the nation’s aid in the late 1970s – by 1986 it distributed as 
much as 44 per cent, the remainder being provided through direct financial transfers (Villanger 
2007: 8). Following the founding of these bilateral institutions, multilateral aid agencies 
                                                 
10 Indeed, some have even claimed that support to post-Gulf War Kuwait served as a form of repayment for that 
country’s earlier charitable largesse, explained below (Villanger 2007). 
11 For instance, the H.H. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation, founded by the ruler of Dubai, 
serves as that emirate’s primary means of disbursing assistance, but, unlike the Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development, it is a private philanthropic organization. 
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emerged. In 1974, multilateral institutions – building on the models of the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which were founded  
in 1964 and 1966 respectively – were established in rapid succession. As with bilateral donor 
institutions, Kuwait led the way with the hosting of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development (AFESD) in 1974 (Nonneman 1988). Its activities were confined strictly to Arab 
League member countries. The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), founded in 1975, has been 
described as an effort to promote Islamic solidarity (Porter 1986; Meenais 1989) and, more 
than other Arab multilateral donor institutions, has promoted Islamic finance (Wilson 2009).12 
The UAE followed suit in 1976 with the establishment of the Arab Monetary Fund 
(AMF) in Abu Dhabi. The AMF, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), focuses 
overwhelmingly on mitigating balance-of-payment deficits (Hallwood and Sinclair 1981). 
Whereas the AFESD, the IsDB and the AMF focused on general development cooperation, 
with particular focus on concessional loans and guarantees, throughout the region, relatively 
more specialized or geographically focused multilateral bodies developed next (Van den 
Boogaerde 1991). First among these specialist agencies was the Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa (BADEA). Based in Khartoum since its founding in 1974, BADEA 
was initially founded to assist those countries which were members of the Organization of 
African Unity but not of the Arab League (BADEA 1974). Beyond its non-Arab geographical 
focus, its activities are generally similar to those of the AFESD, with which it has co-financed 
operations in developing countries. In 2006, for instance, BADEA and the AFESD jointly 
supported the construction of a 246.5-km railway in Namibia in 2006 (Moyo 2006). 
The sole multilateral institution not to focus on loans and other forms of development 
financing has been the Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organization 
(AGFUND). Founded at the recommendation of KSA’s Prince Talal Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud 
in 1980, AGFUND ‘is concerned with the support of sustainable human development efforts 
targeting the neediest in developing countries’, and currently funds programmes such as 
women’s entrepreneurship in Gaza and animal disease surveillance in Somalia (AGFUND 
2004, 2009). With grant-funded assistance for education, health, poverty alleviation and 
public-institution-building, it primarily acts as an Arab-owned channel for Arab countries to 
support UN activities rather than a stand-alone agency. A final multilateral institution 
frequently associated with the Gulf states, although not necessarily a focus of this paper, is the 
                                                 
12 See www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous. 
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OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID). Including all member countries of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it primarily provides loans to 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs), with a narrower focus on grants and post-emergency 
assistance (Benamara and Ifeagwuu 1987). The diversity of its membership, despite receiving 
slightly more than half its contributions from Arab Gulf states, has resulted in a more technical 
and poverty-based allocation of resources rather than any systematic focus on a particular 
region. 
Multilateral Gulf state institutions, despite their number and variety, have traditionally 
proved far less significant, in financial terms, than the bilateral programmes in terms of grant-
funded assistance. Yet numerical data provided by the multilateral agencies frequently appears 
to be far greater than that provided by bilateral agencies such as the Kuwait Fund and the Abu 
Dhabi Fund, thus reflecting the issue of data availability and clarity (Table 1). For instance, 
the IsDB’s own documents claim a far higher level of assistance than it has previously 
reported to the OECD, a fact which appears likely to result from a number of factors, 
including (i) different ways of valuing contributions; (ii) multilateral institutions’ far greater 
use of loan rather than grant financing; and (iii) IsDB’s mobilization of capital from investors 
rather than strictly from member governments. While popular in the years following their 
establishment, multilateral agencies have frequently fallen out of fashion as the Gulf states 
have, like many of their Western counterparts, turned to forms of assistance which is far more 
Table 1. Profiles of major Arab–Gulf donor institutions 
Agency Location Year 
founded 
Lifetime 
contributions 
Average annual 
contributions 
   (US$ million)i  
Bilateral     
KFAED Kuwait 1961 14,035 298.62 
Abu Dhabi Fund UAE 1971 3,533 95.49 
SFD KSA 1974 7,705 226.62 
Multilateral     
AFESD Kuwait 1974 20,789 611.44 
IsDBii KSA 1975 33,900 1,027.27 
OFIDiii Austria 1975/6 10,299 321.84 
AMF UAE 1976 5,080 158.75 
BADEAiv Sudan 1980 3,329 118.89 
AGFUND KSA 1980 235 9.04 
i All conversions from original currencies, where applicable, are done according to the prevailing rate on 4 
August 2009. 
ii IsDB (2008) Islamic Development Bank Group: In Brief. Riyadh: Islamic Development Bank. 
iii Ibid. 
iv BADEA (2008) Annual Report 2008. Khartoum: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. 
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visible in the eyes of the recipients (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005: 12). Multilateral sources have 
comprised an average of between only 3 and 5 per cent of the Gulf states’ total assistance to 
developing countries, according to the OECD (2009), although they appear to be experiencing 
a resurgence after two decades of decreasing support. 
2.2. The origins of Gulf state donorship 
Contemporary Gulf state donorship emerged during and in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab–
Israeli War. Those countries bordering Israel–Palestine, which absorbed large numbers of 
Palestinian refugees and became known as the ‘front-line states’, were the primary targets  
of aid and received more than half of all Gulf state assistance from the late 1960s to the late 
1970s (Porter 1986: 44). These comprised, between 1967 and 1978, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon 
and Syria; Egypt was dropped from this list following its signing of a peace agreement with 
Israel in 1979. 
Yet Arab and Gulf states’ donorship long pre-dates the Arab–Israeli conflict or the 
founding of bilateral and multilateral aid institutions. Many authors highlight its origins in the 
Islamic principle of charity, or zakat, which requires contributions to the poor and vulnerable 
by those who have the means to make them (Anwar 1995; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003; 
ICG 2003; Weiss 2002). Zakat funds had existed, and still exist, for primarily local and 
national causes in many Islamic countries before institutionalized, international donorship 
emerged (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003). Focused overwhelmingly on fellow Arab 
states, as is expressed most firmly in the phrase ‘for Arab Economic Development’ in the 
names of the Gulf’s first two bilateral donor funds, international assistance represented a sense 
of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic solidarity. Over time, however, particularly as Africa, home to 
significant Arab and Islamic populations, followed the Middle East down the path of 
decolonization, Arab–African affinity began to develop (Simmons 1981: 16). Such a trend is 
evident in the emergence of BADEA and the relatively minor Arab Fund for Technical 
Assistance to African and Arab Countries (AFTAAC) in 1977 (Porter 1986).13 A debate over 
the appropriateness of extending zakat to non-Arab and, in particular, non-Islamic populations 
emerged; decided in favour of the broader, less religiously oriented definition, this 
development resulted in an expansion of the Gulf states’ humanitarian mandate (Benthall and 
                                                 
13 AFTAAC focuses on ‘consolidating Afro-Arab relations, and provide the developing African countries with 
some of their needs for human resources, economic and technical development’ (AFTAAC 2009). 
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Bellion-Jourdan 2003). The Kuwait Fund, for instance, expanded its mission statement  
to include both ‘Arab and other developing countries’ in 1974 (Neumayer 2003b). 
While Gulf state donorship is frequently linked with zakat and principles of charity and 
generosity, others see more strategic motives at play. Gulf states’ assistance has been viewed 
as a tool for winning international allies to support anti-Israeli resolutions in the United 
Nations (Mertz and Mertz 1983; Simmons, 1981). Others have hypothesized that the funds, 
which often finance balance-of-payments deficits, are used as a means of lessening the impact 
of high energy costs on poor countries in order to diminish support for the greater regulation 
of oil prices (Hunter 1984). During the 1970s, for instance, the IsDB primarily financed the 
importation of oil by Islamic countries suffering as a result of price shocks. The Abu Dhabi 
Fund and the SFD also acknowledge their own economic interests in using aid to develop 
markets for their (limited) non-oil exports (ADFD 2009; SFD 2009a). Yet, as Neumayer 
(2004: 285) highlights, the attribution of relatively strategic rather than humanitarian motives 
has been led by Western experts. Individuals from the Gulf states and Islamic countries, 
including those interviewed by the authors, have tended to subscribe more fully to 
explanations which centre on religious solidarity and a genuine concern for human well- 
being (Humaidan 1984; Shihata 1982). 
The literature referenced above has tended to remain speculative, based more on 
observations of the Gulf states’ bilateral and multilateral contributions than on any statistical 
analysis of those factors which determine whether a country will receive Gulf state support 
and in what amounts. The sole econometric analysis to date has been provided by Neumayer 
(2003a), who examined the period from 1974 to 1997. His research differentiated between 
those factors that rendered a country more likely to receive Gulf state assistance and those 
which determined the level of assistance which a country was likely to receive. This study 
found that a country is more likely to receive support from Gulf states, through both bilateral 
and multilateral channels, if they are ‘poor, Arab, [and] sub-Saharan African’ or if they vote 
similarly to KSA in the UN General Assembly (Neumayer 2003a: 141). Such countries are 
also likely to receive greater levels of assistance. For instance, an Arab country would receive 
twenty-two times more aid from Gulf states (bilaterally) and 632 per cent more from 
multilateral institutions such as AFESD, IsDB and AMF (Neumayer 2003a: 142–3). Islam and 
relations with Israel, while significant for the receipt of bilateral assistance, were not a factor 
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for multilateral agencies. Such findings appear to bolster arguments that aid from the Gulf is 
more a sign of cultural and, at least for bilateral funds, religious proximity (Strand 1998). 
Poverty and needs-based criteria are significant in gaining access to Gulf state aid, 
although, interestingly, only up to a point. Neumayer (2003a) found that poorer countries do 
not necessarily receive more aid (though they are more likely to gain access to at least some 
funding). Nonneman (1988) further examines this dynamic in highlighting that OPEC donor 
countries, of which Gulf states were the most significant, provided 26 per cent of their aid to 
middle-income countries in 1975, but that this amount rose to 76 per cent by 1981. OECD-
DAC member countries provided only half as much to countries in this category, focusing 
their assistance primarily on low-income and least-developed countries (LICs/LDCs). While 
such figures do not convey motive, they at least suggest that Gulf states (and other OPEC 
members) had in the past preferred to focus assistance on countries which were trade partners 
and major oil importers, or which seemed to have the potential to become so (Heintz and 
Pollin 2008). 
While such factors influenced the Gulf states’ aid allocation, the total amount on offer 
was determined primarily by two key factors: oil prices and the occurrence of crises with 
economic or diplomatic ramifications for the Gulf (UNESCWA 2007). The Arab–Israeli 
conflict, in particular, is responsible for many of the peaks which appear in the timeline of 
Gulf state assistance (Figure 2). The phenomenal increase in Gulf state assistance from the 
early–mid-1970s to the early 1980s, however, is more likely to do with the 429 per cent 
increase in the price of crude oil during this time (Figure 3).  
As is evident in Figure 3, a close relationship existed between the level of Gulf states’ 
donorship and their oil-derived income. With the exception of political shocks, such as the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, aid tended to increase at a slightly greater rate than oil prices 
and, conversely, fell more rapidly when oil prices dropped. Indeed, while it appears that 
tensions with Israel and rising oil prices led to the rapid growth in Gulf state ODA during the 
1970s, it is interesting to note that, despite conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and rising oil 
prices, Gulf states’ global level of foreign assistance continued to decline during the first three 
post-9/11 years (after a sudden increase between 2001 and 2002).14 Given that, at this time, 
Gulf state charities (and Islamic organizations more generally) came under greater scrutiny 
                                                 
14 Between 2002 and 2005, total Gulf state contributions, as monitored by the OECD, declined from US$2.79 
billion to US$1.62 billion. See OECD, ‘Stats’ Query Wizard for International Development Statistics. 
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Figure 3. Deviation of Gulf state ODA and crude oil price from 37-year average, 1970–2007 
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Sources: OECD ‘Stats’, Query Wizard on International Development Statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/; oil 
prices were calculated from monthly data from the International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org. 
 
due to predominantly US concerns regarding their potential ties with terrorist organizations, 
one might have expected government assistance to have increased in order to meet the decline 
in private contributions. Whether the Gulf states were ‘testing the waters’ to understand better 
whether increased oil prices would be sustained or whether aid resources were reallocated to 
internal security concerns, this dynamic, like much of Gulf state donorship, is clearly in need 
of additional exploration and analysis.  
3. GULF STATE ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED ENVIRONMENTS 
In recognition of the need for more nuanced analysis of Gulf states’ international assistance  
to conflict-affected environments, this section begins to address the following question: what 
exactly have the Gulf states been spending their assistance on, where, why and to what effect? 
The authors examine this question in relation to Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and the  
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Table 2. Assistance to selected conflict-affected contextsi from bilateral  
Gulf state donors, 1999–2009 
Donor country Total amount  
(US$ million, value at  
time of disbursement) 
Proportion  
of total 
KSA 926.59 69.30% 
UAE 207.17 15.49% 
Kuwait 167.99 12.56% 
Qatar 35.31 2.64% 
Total 1,337,027,927.00 100.00% 
Source: UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, as of 1 July 2009. 
i These contexts are Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian Territories. 
 
Occupied Palestinian Territories; references will also be made to Yemen, a country in which 
large-scale Gulf state support was offered but ultimately not delivered. Such countries are  
of particular importance to Arab Gulf donors, who recently cited ‘[r]ehabilitation and 
reconstruction in situations of fragility (e.g. Afghanistan; Yemen)’ as one of their key  
‘areas of collaboration’ during a recent Coordination Group meeting (Al-Hamad and 
Deutscher 2009: 3). 
According to the Financial Tracking Service, the aforementioned six contexts, 
including Yemen, received a total of US$1.34 billion bilaterally from Gulf state donors 
between 1999, when the Service began operating, and June 2009 (Table 2).15 More than two-
thirds of this support was provided by KSA with relatively smaller contributions from the 
UAE and Kuwait. Qatar, which, as previously noted, does not employ a dedicated government 
donor body, but which likely provides additional aid which is not publicly recorded, appears to 
be the least significant in these contexts. 
While these financial contributions are refined and further discussed in the case studies 
below, the subsequent analysis focuses less on the amounts, which remain contested and 
contradicted in various data sources, and more on the motives for the aid, the modalities 
through which it was provided, the programming it supported and the impact it had on the 
recipient contexts and the broader region.  
                                                 
15 UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, available at http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/, accessed 1 July 2009. Multilateral 
Gulf-based or Gulf-led institutions do not provide data for the Financial Tracking Service. 
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3.1. Case studies: Gulf state donors in conflict-affected contexts 
Focusing strictly on the post-Cold War era, case study contexts were identified based on the 
volume of Gulf state assistance (either pledged or committed), the occurrence of a large-scale 
(>1,000 fatalities) and clearly time-bounded conflict or phase of conflict and the launch of 
humanitarian relief or recovery activities as a result of the conflict. This list was further 
narrowed by a focus on conflicts which were deemed to be of particular concern to the  
Gulf states, especially those which involved substantial Islamic populations. 
Finally, the authors hoped to focus on relatively recent conflicts for a number of 
reasons. First, these conflicts and the assistance provided to them have been well addressed in 
literature and the media. Second, they are also included in the UN Financial Tracking Service, 
which provides data only since 1999. While contributions prior to 1999 may be roughly 
Figure 4. Reported assistance from Gulf state interventions to selected conflict-affected 
contexts, 1999–2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, as of 1 July 2009. 
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assessed (albeit under the consolidated heading of ‘Arab countries’) through the OECD, the 
Financial Tracking Service has the added benefit of brief descriptions of transfers which 
allowed for coding and broad classification of modalities and programming. Given these 
criteria, the following contexts are addressed below: post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina, post-
9/11 Afghanistan, post-2003 Iraq, post-July War (2006) Lebanon and the Gaza Strip (and 
Occupied Palestinian Territories more generally) prior to and following the 2008–9 conflict 
with Israel (Figure 4 gives a summary of Gulf state contributions to these contexts). 
3.1.1. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Bosnia-Herzegovina proved to be the first major reconstruction project supported by donor 
institutions from the Gulf. Much like the later conflict in Kosovo, in 1999, Arab countries’ 
attention was drawn to the conflict through the perception that it constituted a religious war 
aimed at the destruction of an Islamic population (Champion 1998). KSA, both during the 
conflict and afterwards, was to take a leading role. Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz met the 
Bosniak (Muslim) leader, Alija Izetbegovic, in 1992 and soon thereafter called an emergency 
meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) at which Izetbegovic hoped to 
receive OIC membership for his government and, through it, large-scale military and/or 
diplomatic support (Rogel 2004). The following year the OIC offered 17,000 troops, an offer 
ultimately rejected by the international community, for peacekeeping (BBC 2008). Instead, 
individual, irregular fighters, from KSA in particular, travelled to Bosnia in order to defend 
the Bosniak population. Smaller numbers from Kuwait as well as Yemen, Jordan, Syria and 
Turkey followed suit, many of them having recently participated in a successful insurgency to 
dislodge Soviet forces from Afghanistan (Hedges 1995). Such fighters, while initially 
welcomed, eventually clashed with the moderate and largely ‘cultural’ rather than religious 
forms of Islam which had developed under communism in the former Yugoslavia (Pinson 
1996). Such clashes were also to colour the Gulf states’ efforts at reconstruction following the 
1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which marked the end of the Bosnian conflict. 
By 1997, Islamic countries had pledged just under US$160 million for Bosnia’s 
reconstruction, half of which came from KSA (US$50 million), Kuwait (US$21.15 million) 
and Qatar (US$5 million) (GAO 1997). The remainder was primarily provided by Turkey, 
which has historical and cultural links to Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims, as well as Brunei and 
Malaysia (ibid.). According to the OECD, KSA, Kuwait and the UAE ultimately provided 
US$191.18 million to Bosnia in the decade following the signing of the DPA, or 2.41 per cent 
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of the total given by international donors during that period.16 Media reports, however, 
indicate that KSA provided more than US$600 million for Bosnia after the war for food, 
energy and electricity, thus suggesting that official figures may capture only a portion of  
Gulf state assistance (Whitmore 2002).17 
According to reports from former US National Security Council member Kenneth 
Pollack (2003), Saudi support for the reconstruction process was at least partly undertaken at 
the request of the Clinton administration (rather than strictly due to religious affinity). In 1996 
the US government asked KSA, Kuwait and the UAE to provide funds to the predominantly 
Bosniak (Muslim) Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (VFBiH) for training 
and capacity building (Weiner 1996; Barakat and Zyck 2009b). Such offers were seen as 
attempts to deflect the mounting criticism against Islamic and, in particular, wealthy Arab 
countries which had failed to act to defend Bosnia’s Muslims (Schwartz 2002). Stephen 
Schwartz writes that Muslim politicians and intellectuals in Bosnia ‘are bitter that these  
states watched passively as thousands of indigenous European Muslims were slain in the 
Balkans, offering no assistance aside from press releases, aid donations and religious 
propaganda’ (ibid.).18 
In the light of such perceptions, aid financing for reconstruction and military defence 
appears to have been intended as a form of public diplomacy, intended to repair the Gulf 
states’ tainted image in the Islamic world and at home (Champion 1998). For KSA, in 
particular, an additional set of issues were at stake; one of the country’s main rivals within the 
region, Iran, had sent at least two shipments of weapons to the Bosniak forces (Risen and 
McManus 1996). Concerns were hence raised not only that Iran’s action and KSA’s perceived 
inaction reflected poorly on the latter but also that, in providing arms, Iran had attempted the 
spread of Shia Islam in the Balkans (Schwartz 2000). Such concerns were at times exacerbated 
by the opening of an Iranian cultural centre in the centre of Sarajevo immediately following 
the end of the conflict. 
                                                 
16 Based on information available at OECD, ‘Stats’ Query Wizard for International Development Statistics. 
17 However, it appears likely that only a portion of these, such as the previously indicated US$30 million, were 
from SFD or other official government channels as opposed to private contributions. 
18 Such perceptions, which also existed among some populations in the Gulf, later motivated large-scale public 
donations for Kosovo. One UAE citizen, for instance, personally donated $1.825 million to aid the local Muslim 
populations in Kosovo, and telethons in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait raised $19 million and $7 million, respectively, 
for the same cause (Hanley 1999). 
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Partly due to a degree of partly confessional competition between Iran and KSA, the 
majority of Saudi support was dedicated to the resurrection of Mosques damaged or destroyed 
during the conflict (Schwartz 2000).19 Rehabilitation and reconstruction were pursued 
according to Saudi designs which conflicted with the Ottoman architecture of the country’s 
mosques (Peuraca 2003). According to the Zurich-based International Relations and Security 
Network (ISN 2009b), these mosques were ‘run by the Saudis entirely, with no involvement 
by the local Bosnian Islamic community’. As a result, Saudi assistance was deemed to be 
culturally insensitive by a portion of the Bosniak community and, in some respects, 
intimidating to Croat and Serb populations fearful of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism  
in the region, particularly given the role played by foreign Islamic fighters during the war in 
Bosnia (ibid.). 
Further assistance was dedicated to school building and education, which provided an 
opportunity for Wahhabi religious teachings. These schools required female students to cover 
their heads, a practice which was previously uncommon (although it is gaining in popularity) 
among Bosnian Muslims (ICG 2001). Such demands were at times perceived to be 
infringements of Bosniak culture, and polls show that 70 per cent of Bosnian Muslims 
opposed Wahhabism (ISN 2009b). As such, KSA’s first reconstruction intervention appears  
to have been only partly ‘humanitarian’ in nature (Whitmore 2002).  
3.1.2. Post-9/11 Afghanistan 
Aside from Kosovo, which reportedly experienced a Saudi-funded reconstruction process 
similar to that in Bosnia (Schwartz 2000, 2002; BBC 1999), the Gulf states were next 
confronted with the rehabilitation process in post-2001 Afghanistan. While KSA had long 
supported the mujahideen and, later, the Taliban, it was only after the US-led invasion in 2001 
that Gulf states’ humanitarian involvement in the country was overtly institutionalized and 
formalized. The January 2002 donor conference on the reconstruction of Afghanistan, held in 
Tokyo, was co-chaired by KSA and attended by representatives from Kuwait, Qatar and the 
UAE, one sign that Gulf state donor institutions were considered to be key partners in the 
country’s recovery and development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2002). At that 
conference KSA pledged US$220 million over three years (or US$73.33 million per year), the 
                                                 
19 According to Champion (1998), Saudi funds paid initially for the following mosque and infrastructure projects: 
the restoration of 115 mosques, the furnishing of 330 mosques, the construction of mosques in Tuzla and 
Sarajevo, the construction of Saudi and Islamic cultural centres in Mostar, Bihac and Sarajevo, the restoration of 
schools, the reconstruction of 600 homes, and the construction of 159 km of railway tracks. 
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sixth largest pledge in annual terms behind the European Union (US$500 million p.a.), the 
United States (US$296 million p.a.), Japan (US$200 million p.a.), the World Bank (US$200 
million p.a.) and Iran (US$112 million p.a.) (UN-OCHA 2002). The UAE pledged US$36 
million across an unspecified time period, an amount which was increased to US$50 million 
later in the year. Kuwait, while not pledging funds at the Tokyo conference, later ‘committed’ 
US$30 million (ibid.). 
The Saudi and UAE pledges accounted, in net rather than annual terms, for 5.69 per 
cent of all pledges made at that conference. Hamid Karzai, then Afghanistan’s interim leader, 
recognized the Gulf states’ potentially crucial role in his country’s reconstruction; the month 
after the donor conference he travelled to Abu Dhabi to reopen his country’s embassy in the 
UAE. While there, he noted that Gulf states would and should give ‘more, more, more aid to 
Afghanistan, because they are Muslims, they are our neighbours, and they are rich’ (Afghan 
News Centre 2002). Despite this, Lakhdar Brahimi, who served as the UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative in Afghanistan, noted that the Gulf states played a ‘very marginal’  
role in the reconstruction of that country, a sentiment which is supported by the financial  
data available. 
Pledged funds largely failed to materialize, a fact which some attribute to the Afghan 
government’s reliance on the West and inadequate courtship of the Arab Gulf states. 
According to the OECD, KSA, Kuwait and the UAE provided a net total of US$68.19 million 
from 2001 to 2007 for Afghanistan, or approximately one-quarter of the pledged amount. As 
of 2007, the Gulf states’ bilateral and multilateral contributions to Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction amounted to less than half of 1 per cent of the total.20 
As with all case study countries, different data sources provide marginally different 
pictures. The SFD (2009b) indicates that KSA provided loans of US$82 million for road repair 
and construction in Afghanistan as of late 2008, an amount which is still considerably lower 
than that pledged. The UAE also fell short, with US$4.58 million from the Abu Dhabi Fund 
for road and bridge construction and another US$30 million from the Abu Dhabi government 
for unspecified purposes; more than US$15 million of the pledged funds have not been 
provided (ADFD 2009).21 Indeed, the United Nations notes that the UAE neither committed 
nor disbursed any funds for Afghanistan’s reconstruction in the first three years following the 
                                                 
20 OECD, ‘Stats’ Query Wizard for International Development Statistics. 
21 As such, the UAE’s pledge of US$550 million for Afghanistan went largely unreported, likely due to 
incredulity, in 2008 (Sambidge 2008). 
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US-led intervention (UNDP 2004). Kuwait appears to be the only donor country which may 
have delivered on its pledges, with slightly more than US$30 million for the multilateral 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) according to the Kuwait Fund project 
database.22 The Afghanistan National Human Development Report of 2004 – which is the last 
to note donor contributions – notes, however, that Kuwait had pledged US$45 million, but had 
only provided US$10 million (UNDP 2004). 
Representatives of the Afghan government, particularly its Ministry for Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development, interviewed by the authors, noted that ‘the amount from Gulf 
states is far too little, bearing in mind that we are a Muslim country in crisis’. They and also 
Lakhdar Brahimi stated that unrecorded amounts of aid from the Gulf – whether government 
or private – were provided but that they had overwhelmingly funded religious education, 
Islamic ‘clubs’ and madrasas rather than genuinely humanitarian priorities such as safe 
drinking water. According to one official, ‘I think we received around US$250 million from 
the Saudis for building a religious group. But really does Afghanistan need a religious group 
when it doesn’t have food and water?’ Such comments were commonly joined by accusations 
that Gulf states, particularly KSA, had continued formally or informally to support the Taliban 
and, hence, constituted an impediment to rather than a partner in reconstruction.  
Regardless of the political and confessional agendas at play, the amounts provided 
were overwhelmingly for infrastructure, particularly roads. KSA, for instance, currently has a 
road construction programme worth $30 million under way, aiming to link the northern and 
western parts of the country through the Armalik–Sabzak–Qalainau highway (SFD 2009b). 
The UN’s Financial Tracking Service, however, also notes that the Gulf states provided 
humanitarian assistance via UN agencies and Red Crescent societies for relief materials, 
including 643 tonnes of Saudi dates. In addition to foodstuffs, medicine, blankets, tents and 
other materials from the Gulf states, Kuwait reportedly provided US$200,000 for agricultural 
programming and US$500,000 for mine action.23 
The motives underlying these relatively minor, formal contributions remain 
unspecified. However, it seems likely that funds from KSA and the UAE, two of the three 
countries to have recognized the Taliban government (Pakistan was the third), may have been 
                                                 
22 The KFAED project database may be accessed at www.kuwait-fund.org/index.php?option=com_kfaed. 
23 UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, accessed 1 July 2009. 
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intended to signal to the United States their support for the post-9/11, US-led intervention and 
for the subsequent political dispensation in Afghanistan. 
3.1.3. Post-Saddam Iraq 
The Gulf states were soon afterwards presented with the opportunity to help rebuild a country 
in their midst, albeit one which had consistently antagonized its neighbours (Washington 
Times 2008). Clearly torn between international, particularly US, encouragement to support 
their fellow Arabs and their long-standing animosities, Gulf states pledged large amounts of 
assistance for Iraq’s reconstruction but once again failed to deliver (GAO 2007). KSA pledged 
US$500 million to Iraqi reconstruction in addition to another $500 million in export credits 
but, according to late 2008 data from the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development 
Cooperation’s (MOPDC) Donor Assistance Database, has provided nothing in either grants or 
loans.24 During the first half of 2009, however, KSA provided US$5 million, or 1 per cent of 
its pledge, not for Iraq but rather for regional activities supporting displaced Iraqis elsewhere 
in the region.25 Kuwait, which pledged US$516 million, has seemingly provided only US$16.2 
million, or slightly more than 3 per cent of its pledge, according to the Iraqi government 
(MOPDC 2007: 3). The Emirates, which pledged US$215 million, and Qatar, which pledged 
US$100 million, have yet to provide any assistance according to publicly available sources 
(Blanchard and Dale 2007; MOPDC 2007, 2008). Loan repayment also emerged as a major 
issue, with neighbouring countries and Arab-identified multilateral institutions among the least 
willing to forgive past debts and Gulf War I-related reparations. For instance, in 2008, the 
AMF wrote off $100 million of interest on Iraqi debt, although it refused to forgive the 
remaining $400 million (Associated Press 2008). In total, the Gulf states appear to owe more 
than US$1.3 billion in unfulfilled pledges to Iraq. It should be noted, however, that many 
countries beyond the Gulf states have fallen short of their aid pledges. News reports indicate 
that only 16 per cent of the internationally pledged funds for Iraq’s reconstruction have been 
disbursed (Kelley 2008).26 
 
                                                 
24 The Donor Assistance Database can be accessed at www.mop-iraq.org/mopdc/index.jsp?id=128&lng=en. 
25 UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service. 
26 The figure of 84 per cent is calculated on the basis of data available in MOPDC (2008). Note that ‘pledges’ 
refers to funds which donors have publicly offered, while ‘commitments’ are those amounts which donor 
governments have allocated through legislative and/or budgetary processes; ‘disbursements’ are those funds from 
the donor which are eventually received by the recipient. 
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Table 3. International grant-funded assistance for Iraqi reconstruction 
Donor Pledged  Committed Balance 
 (US$ million)   
Kuwait 516.20 10.00 506.20 
KSA 500.00 0 500.00 
UAE 215.00 0 215.00 
USA 18,410.00 15,634.49 2,775.51 
EU 687.82 693.95 -6.13 
Source: Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Report on Donors’  
Contributions to Reconstruction Efforts up to September 30, 2008, p. 5. 
While contributions of primary relief materials such as foodstuffs, medicine and 
clothes have continued (primarily through local Red Crescent societies and UN agencies)  
from the first bombing until the present, bilateral assistance to support long-term state 
reconstruction has been minimal (Cox 2003). This failure to disburse aid directly to the Iraqi 
government may have highlighted a Gulf anxiety over supporting a neighbour whose ‘friendly 
status’ had not yet been assured. One Saudi minister, for instance, explained in 2003 that his 
nation’s pledge ‘can’t go anywhere until there can be actual movement toward development’ 
(Richter 2003). Such comments have, however, been interpreted as implying the Gulf states’ 
trepidation about supporting an Iraqi government which many view as dominated by Shias and 
Kurds rather than Sunni Arabs, and likely more friendly towards Iran than the Arab Gulf states 
themselves. 
3.1.4. Post-July-War Lebanon 
Lebanon provides, perhaps, the only example of fulfilled contributions from the Gulf states 
and the case which the authors have examined in the greatest detail (Barakat and Zyck 2008). 
Following the July War in 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah, more than 1,100 civilians were 
killed and 100,000 dwellings were damaged or destroyed. The damage to infrastructure was 
significant, and Gulf state donors determined to intervene in a manner not seen since the 
Second Intifada in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. KSA provided US$600 million, 
US$315 million of which was targeted at housing rehabilitation. The Kuwait Fund, according 
to the authors’ interviews, allocated US$300 million in total, including US$115 million for 
housing compensation. Qatar, while not providing records publicly or to the Lebanese 
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Table 4. Housing-related contributions from Gulf states  
to post-July War Lebanon 
Donor Amount 
(US$ million)i 
Qatar  149.98 
KSA  315.00 
Kuwait  115.00 
Other non-OECD-DAC donors 42.00 
Total 621.98 
Source: Barakat & Zyck (2008). 
i These values reflect the amounts provided at the time of disbursements,  
primarily between late 2006 and mid-2007. 
 
authorities, is estimated to have contributed at least US$150 million.27 Other Middle Eastern 
and Islamic donors, including aid recipients such as Iraq, Jordan, Indonesia and Yemen, 
provided another US$42 million for the housing sector, according to representatives of the 
Lebanese High Relief Commission. Much of this assistance was provided according to an 
‘adopt a village’ model organized by the OIC, whereby donor countries identified particularly 
damaged communities on which to concentrate their assistance. The remainder of funds, 
according to the Nabil El-Jisr, president of the Council on Development and Reconstruction, 
had been allocated to the government in order to finance operating costs and other ‘gaps’ 
which Western donors were unwilling to address. 
The July 2006 war in Lebanon, condemned throughout the Gulf states and beyond as 
an act of Israeli aggression (or over-reaction), led to wide-scale involvement of Islamic donors 
(Pascual and Indyk 2006). The assumption – which proved accurate – that Shia Iran would 
play a major role in rebuilding the south and strengthening its foothold there also impelled the 
predominantly Sunni Gulf states to view contributions as a public diplomacy battle oriented 
towards winning hearts and minds. This strategy can clearly be seen in Qatar’s concentration 
of funds, up to a quarter of a billion dollars according to some estimates, in the southern Shia 
stronghold of Bint Jbeil (Putz 2007). Iranian contributions, in the meantime, were delivered 
primarily via Hezbollah and a Hezbollah-affiliated NGO, Jihad al-Bina’a. While figures were 
never publicly disclosed, the authors (Barakat and Zyck 2008) estimate that Iranian 
                                                 
27 This estimate was provided by the Lebanese High Relief Commission. The authors’ own calculations dispute 
this figure, however, and indicate that the total amount provided by Qatar may have been closer to US$300 
million. 
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contributions equalled between US$600 million and US$900 million for temporary shelter, 
rental housing and furniture alone.28 
Unlike the examples cited above, in which cases the Gulf states had made prominent 
pledges at international donor conferences, their involvement here was far more discreet. 
Publicity for these contributions was surprisingly sparse, and few outside the country were 
aware of the scale of assistance, despite the fact that Lebanon may represent the first instance 
of a post-crisis recovery process which was driven and financed primarily by non-OECD-
DAC member countries.  
Each donor country adopted a unique delivery mechanism. According to Lebanese 
government officials and representatives of the Saudi Popular Committee for Lebanese Relief, 
KSA and other minor donors such as Egypt and Jordan, for instance, transferred funds to the 
Lebanese government and allowed the relevant government agencies to disburse them. Qatar 
provided funds directly to individual families without involving Lebanese officials (Barakat 
and Zyck 2008). Finally, Kuwait employed an innovative mechanism by providing the 
Lebanese government with cheques made out to each head of household that the Kuwait Fund 
intended to assist with housing compensation. These cheques were then distributed by 
Lebanese government personnel, thus allowing the state to play a visible role without enabling 
it to misappropriate any of the contributed funds. The different means of delivering assistance 
had a major impact on the amounts of money received by households, recipient satisfaction 
and the reputations of the donor countries. For instance, the Lebanese High Relief 
Commission’s reports indicate that, primarily with support from KSA, they disbursed 
approximately US$8,200  to each of 35,611 households, but recipients report having received 
slightly more than a third of that amount (US$2,757.69). As a result, 70 per cent of those 
assisted by Qatar and Kuwait reported being satisfied with the assistance received, whereas the 
same held true for only 22.2 per cent of who had been assisted with funds originating from 
KSA but delivered by Lebanese government agencies (Barakat and Zyck 2008). As if evident 
from this example, the amounts provided by the Gulf states to conflict-affected environments 
may be understood as only one (albeit important) aspect of their donorship activities. 
                                                 
28 Iranian contributions were taken  to be nearly all of the funds disbursed by the Hezbollah-linked NGO, Jihad 
al-Bina’a. This organization contributed, according to two surveys conducted by the authors, between US$6,221 
and US$9,928 per household to approximately 100,000 households. Additional funds, bringing the total up to 
US$1 billion or more, were contributed at a later phase for small business rehabilitation, agricultural 
compensation and housing reconstruction. 
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Modalities of delivery and the design of assistance packages may prove equally if not  
far more important in many cases. 
3.1.5. Post-conflict (2008–9) Gaza 
Following the 2006 July War in Lebanon, the next major Gulf state-led reconstruction effort 
was centred on the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the Israeli military offensive in late 2008 and 
early 2009. At the March 2009 donors’ conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, KSA pledged US$1 
billion and Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE followed suit with offers, respectively, of US$250 
million, US$200 million and US$174 million (Arab Times 2009). Gulf state contributions 
were nearly twice the US$884 million offered by the United States and European Union for 
Gaza, a fact one interviewee from Islamic Relief linked to ‘Arab guilt that they did not provide 
any meaningful efforts to stop the war’. 
The majority of Gulf state funds have yet to be disbursed (Bronner 2009). As the ICRC 
(2010: 365) notes, ‘Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods and people into and out of 
the Gaza Strip continued to … impede reconstruction of the territory’. Given such limitations, 
it remains to be seen, if access issues are eventually addressed, what Gulf states will ultimately 
contribute and for what purpose (Barakat, Zyck and Hunt 2009). At present, the Financial 
Tracking Service notes transfers of just over US$60 million from the Gulf states in response  
to the Gaza crisis, comprising US$34 million from Kuwait, US$17.24 million from Qatar, 
US$10.38 from KSA and US$2.45 million from the UAE.29 The ICRC notes that Kuwaiti 
assistance, which was provided by the Amir, funded food, shelter, services and cash 
 provision for Gazan refugees. 
Other contributions have also been provided from the Gulf, although their provenance 
remains difficult to ascertain. For instance, the ICRC and UNRWA note additional cash and 
food donations via the Kuwait and UAE Red Crescent societies, and Qatari doctors were sent 
to provide emergency medical assistance after the war in Gaza, although the sources of such 
aid are likely private as well as public (ICRC 2009; UNRWA 2009, 2010). For instance,  
the Kuwaiti Red Cross donated US$261,966 in cash and fourteen truckloads of food to  
Gaza, while the UAE provided US$100,000 in cash along with ten ambulances (UNRWA 
2009, 2010). 
                                                 
29 UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, accessed 1 July 2009. 
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4. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Based on the admittedly narrow range of case studies above, it is possible to identify a number 
of trends related to Gulf state donors’ motives, modalities, programming and adherence to 
international conventions of aid effectiveness. In addition, this section addresses a number  
of broader implications related, for instance, to issues of state-building, conflict sensitivity  
and regional cooperation. 
4.1. Motives 
As suggested in the case studies, Gulf state donorship to conflict-affected environments was 
driven by a number of different factors. These overwhelmingly concern political and 
humanitarian matters, this study finding that economic interests or motivations played little or 
no role in determining the Gulf states’ allocation of aid to war-torn contexts. The following 
motives appear to be the most significant: (i) diplomacy and stability; (ii) solidarity with the 
Palestinian cause; and (iii) humanitarian concern. As will be further examined, Gulf state aid 
also appears to be what the authors term a ‘diplomatic defence mechanism’ which allows them 
to maintain the status quo and prevent the escalation of conflicts within the region to the point 
at which they challenge the stability or economic interests of donor states (Mertz and Mertz 
1983; Simmons 1981). These various motives are addressed individually below. 
4.1.1. Diplomacy and stability 
The diplomatic dimensions of assistance appear to be of key significance to Gulf states in the 
announcement and allocation of humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction financing. As a 
result, pledges tend significantly to outstrip eventual commitments and disbursements of aid.30 
While intended government recipients will be aware of the donors’ financial shortfalls, local 
populations may be aware only of high-profile pledges. As such, rather than being primarily a 
form of government-to-government diplomacy, Gulf states’ humanitarian assistance often 
comprises a form of ‘public diplomacy’ intended to target recipient nations’ citizenries rather 
than their public officials (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005; Melissen 2005). Sizeable assistance 
packages or prominent pledges help to win allies for the donor or would-be donor government 
and reduce the likelihood that conflicts in neighbouring countries will spread, either through 
the movement of personnel or transfer of ideologies or grievances, to the Gulf states. 
Humanitarian assistance thus contributes in some ways to the economic and political security 
                                                 
30 See note 26 above for an explanation of the difference between pledges, commitments and disbursements. 
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of the donor country and to the maintenance of a status quo which currently serves the 
interests of Gulf state elites (Zhang 2006). Such motives were viewed as underlying Gulf state 
contributions, including US$100 million each from Qatar and the UAE and US$500 million 
from Kuwait, to the United States following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. These contributions 
comprised an attempt to strengthen bilateral relations between the Gulf and the American 
people. This example, however, draws into question the presumed public diplomacy benefits 
of aid and the need for greater attention to the perceptions of populations in recipient 
countries; Gulf states’ offers, aside from US$100 million from the Qatar Katrina Fund, were 
ultimately declined and were, in some circles, perceived as meddlesome and, in some respects, 
insulting (Solomon and Hsu 2007).  
Furthermore, less overt motives appear to be at play in Gulf states’ donorship to 
conflict-affected environments. More specifically, donorship is used as a ‘diplomatic defence 
mechanism’ to deflect criticism of what could be perceived as the Gulf states’ points of 
political vulnerability. This dynamic is perhaps most evident in the case of post-July-War 
southern Lebanon and the contemporary Gaza Strip. In these cases, aid helped to distract 
attention from the close relationship between Gulf state governments and the United States, 
Israel’s chief ally and weapons supplier. According to a similar logic, some have argued that 
Qatari aid to southern Lebanon may have arisen from Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani’s 
unease that the weaponry to bomb Bint Jbeil passed through a US military base west of Doha 
(Putz 2007). Likewise, Saudi relief donations to tsunami-affected regions of south and south-
east Asia were tripled in January 2005, to divert criticism after an initial offering of US$10 
million was met with public outcry about a lack of support for south-east Asian Muslims 
(CNN 2005; BBC 2005).  
Gulf state donors have, albeit less overtly or perhaps consciously, attempted to utilize 
assistance as a form of competition between one another and between themselves and other 
regional powers. As is evident in the emergence of Gulf state donor institutions, Kuwaiti 
leadership in humanitarian activities, first with the Kuwait Fund and later with the AFESD, 
motivated KSA and the UAE to establish similar bilateral and multilateral institutions. 
Similarly, Qatari donorship and conflict resolution efforts have recently been described as 
responses to Egypt’s and KSA’s traditional leadership in humanitarian and diplomatic affairs 
within the region (ISN 2009a). The Qatari leadership, it has been noted, may tend to view aid 
as well as increased engagement in conflict resolution activities in Yemen, Sudan and the 
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Occupied Palestinian Territories as a means of establishing a regional and global role 
disproportionate to its size. In doing so, Qatar has been perceived as attempting to earn 
recognition as one of the regional diplomatic heavyweights alongside Egypt, Jordan,  
KSA and, increasingly, Syria.  
4.1.2. Palestinian solidarity 
Given the high levels of assistance consistently provided by the Gulf states to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories and particularly its pledges for Gaza following the most recent conflict, 
it is apparent that aid is intended to demonstrate support for and solidarity with the Palestinian 
people. In presenting Saudi Arabia’s US$1 billion pledge for the reconstruction of Gaza at the 
start of 2009, King Abdullah emotively highlighted his nation’s commitment to Palestinian 
solidarity at a two-day summit with seventeen other heads of state: ‘I know that one drop of 
Palestinian blood is more valuable than the treasures of the world’ (Salem 2009). Such a 
sentiment was emphasized during an interview by Mohammad Shtayeh, Palestinian Minister 
of Public Works and Housing, who noted that ‘the Arab states are completely motivated in  
our case by helping the people of Palestine’. 
As discussed further below in relation to ‘underlying motives’, such solidarity is 
particularly important considering that the Gulf states may be perceived as insufficiently 
supportive – in political rather than rhetorical terms – of Palestinian rights and statehood, 
given their strong diplomatic, economic and military relationships with the variably but 
decisively pro-Israel West. According to such an understanding, Gulf state assistance to the 
Palestinian people becomes a form of ‘financial jihad’ to compensate for their inability or 
unwillingness to support military action in defence of the Palestinian people. 
4.1.3. Humanitarian concern 
Despite the more strategic aims described above (and below), it is also critical to recognize 
that genuine humanitarian concern also underlies Gulf state contributions in particular 
circumstances. The high rates of Gulf state donorship to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and, without much publicity, to post-July-War Lebanon indicate that a 
fundamental concern for the well-being of war-affected populations, particularly Islamic 
populations, also exists. As is the case with many Western donors and institutions, such as the 
World Bank or USAID, the presence of diplomatic, economic or security-oriented incentives 
for donorship does not necessarily indicate an absence of empathetic humanitarian sentiment. 
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Indeed, as is further discussed below, the lack of conditionalities or policy objectives linked  
to Gulf state aid further implies that, indeed, these donors have frequently opted out of  
further politicizing their aid, even when the opportunity presented itself (Cotterrell and  
Harmer 2005; Villanger 2007). 
4.1.4. Why not more? 
Finally, it is critical to understand why relatively little assistance was provided to these 
conflict-affected environments in the Middle East. Consider, for instance, that Gulf state 
contributions to Africa increased by more than 400 per cent at the same time – 2003–4 – that 
major reconstruction operations were being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the most 
part, the Gulf states frequently appeared hesitant to donate, given that their contributions 
would likely, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, be viewed as a form of collusion with the 
US government. Participation in donor conferences and aid pledges may have been required to 
appease Western officials, who had high expectations of the Saudis, in particular, in post-
conflict operations, although Gulf state rulers appear to have had little interest in being 
affiliated with the global ‘war on terror’ on any level. Furthermore, even large-scale assistance 
to Afghanistan and Iraq would both have deprived Gulf states of the recognition they sought, 
given that their contributions would be one among many. Put another way, the Gulf states 
appear to prefer intervening in places, such as Lebanon or perhaps Yemen, in which they  
will be able to lead rather than simply contribute to the aid community. The paucity of such 
opportunities for Gulf state humanitarian leadership has thus resulted in an otherwise 
surprising lack of engagement in contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
4.2. Modalities 
The selection of an aid modality, or the form in which assistance is provided, is a critical 
element, given the effect which various modalities will eventually have on aid effectiveness 
and impact (Barakat 2009). For instance, budgetary support may help to strengthen a recipient 
government, although providing funds to well-qualified local or international NGOs may 
result in greater accountability and more participatory approaches (Schiavo-Campo 2003). 
Such technical matters have significant implications for state-building and aid effectiveness. 
Whereas OECD-DAC donors have traditionally employed direct execution via international 
NGOs and, increasingly, private contractors and the military, the Gulf states provide nearly 
half of their assistance bilaterally to recipient governments (Table 5). The remainder of the 
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Table 5. Modalities of Gulf state assistance to selected conflict-affected  
contexts,i 1999–2009 
Recipient category Total amount 
(US$ million, value  
at time of disbursement) 
Proportion of 
total 
       % 
Bilateral, government-to-
government 
629.37 46.77 
Red Cross and Red Crescent 
societies 
188.68 14.11 
United Nations agencies 179.55 13.43 
Other recipient/not specified 343.43 25.69 
Source: UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, as of 1 July 2009. 
i These contexts are Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian Territories. 
 
assistance is channelled via the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and through the United 
Nations, particularly UNRWA. 
Gulf states’ selection of aid modalities belies several underlying interests and values. 
First, these countries have preferred to act as donors in the simplest of terms. Rather than 
establishing large foreign offices or direct involvement with technical dimensions of projects, 
the Gulf states have traditionally concentrated operations around their headquarters. As such, 
they have tended near-universally to front-load project management with extensive pre-
approval assessments but little post-approval follow up. In the 1970s, for instance, the Kuwait 
Fund was working with fewer than thirty-five staff, despite the fact that by 1978 it had 
approved 124 loans to forty-five countries totalling more than $1.6 billion (Lawton 1979b). 
Second, the Gulf states continue to have few international NGOs or implementing agencies 
through which to disburse their assistance or which can implement programmes on their 
behalf. Exemplar organizations from the region, such as the Qatar-based Reach Out to Asia 
(ROTA), have been established by, or are closely affiliated with, the countries’ royal 
families.31 Third, the reliance on Red Crescent societies and UNRWA, which are among the 
most trusted institutions in at least the Middle East, shows a desire to engage with 
implementing partners which are viewed as politically neutral and overwhelmingly concerned 
with humanitarian well-being or human security rather than with modifying gender relations, 
instituting new forms and patterns of governance or advocating in favour of democracy  
and human rights. 
                                                 
31 Reach Out to Asia, for instance, was conceived by Qatar’s heir apparent, His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin 
Hamad Al-Thani, and is chaired by Her Excellency Sheikha Mayassa bint Hamad Al-Thani. 
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Finally, these modalities comprise, albeit implicitly, an argument in favour of recipient 
states’ sovereignty. Providing funds to the states, rather than to non-governmental or 
international implementing agencies, supports the legitimacy of those states and respects their 
role as the overseer of activities in their territory (Barakat 2009). The Gulf states purport 
neither to create alternative power bases in recipient countries nor to use aid as a forcible or 
discreet means of promoting social or political change (with KSA’s activities in Bosnia an 
exception). In contrast, the OECD (2008b) survey on implementation of the Paris Declaration 
shows that only 22 per cent of ODA from OECD member countries is provided in the form of 
bilateral budgetary assistance. Given the OECD’s campaign to double donors’ levels of 
budgetary support, it appears that Gulf state donor institutions are currently far ahead of their 
primarily Western counterparts. 
While effective in terms of recipient selection, Gulf states’ particular use of budgetary 
support should also be viewed as problematic in some respects. International momentum 
behind bilateral assistance, as previously noted, is based on the assumption that such transfers 
enhance public financial management (PFM) and aid accountability (OECD 2008b). Yet Gulf 
states have traditionally been unwilling to tie assistance by linking it with performance 
measures. As such, the benefits of budgetary support may fail to materialize in places such as 
Lebanon or the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In such cases, the lack of conditionalities 
related to aid management reflects a missed opportunity to improve the capacities and 
transparency of recipient states. More broadly, the lack of conditionalities related to 
democratic governance, human rights and women’s empowerment may be understood as 
critical for, as previously noted, respecting the political and sociocultural sovereignty of the 
recipient government and population. For instance, Nabil El-Jisr of the Lebanese Council on 
Development and Reconstruction noted that Western donors tended to tell the government that 
‘we prefer this or that’, rather than recognizing their ability to set priorities or engage in a 
more collaborative discussion of aid usage. The limited application of aid conditionalities also, 
however, reflects the Gulf states’ unwillingness to pressure aid recipients to pursue standards 
of citizen participation, accountability, gender equity and transparent financial management 
which they themselves have not met. 
4.3. Programming 
Indeed, as in the case of conditionalities, the activities supported by Gulf states are limited by 
the donor countries’ domestic contexts. Unable or unwilling to pursue improved governance,  
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Table 6. Types of Gulf state assistance to selected conflict-affected contexts, i 1999–2009 
 Total number of 
projects/ 
contributions 
Proportion of  
total projects/ 
contributions 
             % 
Total amount of 
assistance 
 
    US$ million 
Proportion  
of total 
assistance 
         % 
Relief 120 62.83 517.22 38.70 
Reconstruction 21 10.99 44.43 3.32 
Development 9 4.71 5.05 0.38 
Unknown type 41 21.47 769.63 57.59 
Source: UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, as of 1 July 2009. 
i These contexts are Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories. 
democracy, women’s rights, pro-poor policies or other forms of social or political equity and 
access at home, Gulf state donors are loath to include such priorities in their humanitarian 
activities abroad. As such, the Gulf states have traditionally limited their activities to those 
which are largely devoid of political significance, including infrastructure, economic 
development, basic education and humanitarian assistance. Such a conclusion is largely 
confirmed by the data. Based on an analysis of UN-OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service, the 
vast majority of Gulf state assistance supports basic life-saving and life-sustaining relief 
programmes rather than more invasive forms of social, economic or political reform (Table 6). 
More than 60 per cent of all transfers recorded in the Financial Tracking Service to the 
select conflict-affected contexts examined in this paper went to relief activities. While only 
38.7 per cent of funds supported these activities, the vast majority of the ‘unknown type’ was 
also likely dedicated to basic relief and emergency response although not classified as such, 
given that it was labelled in such a manner which disallowed coding (for instance, as support 
to the families of Palestinian ‘martyrs’).32 Far smaller sums, only accounting for those 
reported in the Financial Tracking Service, were provided for post-conflict or post-disaster 
reconstruction activities, such as a $400,000 contribution from Kuwait through the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the reconstruction of health infrastructure 
in Iraq. Almost none of the reported aid was provided for sustainable, long-term, 
development-oriented activities. This fact may result from the tendency to use databases such 
as the Financial Tracking Service primarily in response to major mid- or post-crisis 
                                                 
32 UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, accessed 1 July 2009. Coding of entries into this system (determining 
whether they constituted relief, reconstruction/recovery, or development assistance) was done using a two-step 
system. Where a contribution was described as being a response to a humanitarian appeal (such as for ‘Gaza 
Crisis 2009’), it was coded as relief. When no such indication was given, the brief contributions were analysed 
according to keywords in order to determine the nature of the aid. When no determination was possible, 
assistance was labelled ‘unknown’. 
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humanitarian appeals, although the Gulf states’ focus on ‘quick interventions’ such as ‘food 
distribution’ while foregoing ‘long-term planning’ was noted by several interviewees. 
Technical assistance was the category of aid least addressed by the Gulf states. Less 
than US$1,000,000 was dedicated to technical assistance according to coding of the limited 
data available.33 The vast majority of Gulf state aid included in-kind assistance, ranging from 
donations of food, water and medication to the provision of ambulances and other vehicles. 
Projects or programmes, which generally comprise the largest use of Western aid dollars, 
accounted for only 22.36 per cent of the Gulf states’ activities in conflict-affected 
environments. Such interventions, which were nearly always implemented by UN agencies  
on behalf of the Gulf states, almost universally focused on the following sectors: agriculture, 
education, primary healthcare, and water and sanitation.34 Those projects and programmes 
directly implemented (or sub-contracted out) by the Gulf states overwhelmingly concerned 
infrastructure. Absent among Gulf states’ activities are sectors such as governance, social 
protection and economic development, which account for large shares of Western donors’ 
assistance. (Economic development is commonly pursued by the Gulf states through business 
partnerships, risk insurance and other facilitative activities, rather than through humanitarian 
agencies or mechanisms.) 
As such, the key difference between the Gulf states’ and Western donors’ 
programming has often been characterized as ‘hardware’ versus ‘software’, with the former 
often preferring to build hospitals while the latter train the staff, contribute to health-care 
policies and provide other forms of technical assistance (Al-Hamad and Deutscher 2009: 2). 
While clearly an oversimplification, such a comparison has often struck a chord with both 
Western and Gulf state officials interviewed by the authors, who were unanimous in noting 
that such a division of labour was in many ways beneficial, as long as it was accompanied by 
adequate technical coordination.  
On the basis of the figures given in Table 7, one can see that the Gulf states have  
found it difficult to move their programming from relief to reconstruction or recovery,  
or development. This degree of focus has made the Gulf states effective actors in their 
specialized fields, although it has also prevented them from supporting or engaging in  
the sorts of activities necessary for overcoming poverty and promoting stability in their 
                                                 
33 UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, accessed 1 July 2009. 
34 For brief descriptions of these contributions, see UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, accessed 1 July 2009. 
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Table 7. Forms of Gulf state assistance to selected conflict-affected contexts, i 1999–2009 
 Total number of 
project/ 
contributions 
Proportion of total 
projects/ 
contributions 
             % 
Total amount of 
assistance 
 
    US$ million 
Proportion of 
total assistance
 
         % 
In-kind assistance 62 32.46 184.43 13.79 
Technical 
assistance 
8 4.19 0.87 0.07 
Projects/ 
programmes 
40 20.94 298.9 22.36 
Unknown 
modality 
81 42.41 852.82 63.79 
Source: UN-OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, as of 1 July 2009. 
i These contexts are Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories. 
region in the medium to long term. While further examination is necessary to understand 
better the Gulf states’ difficulty in becoming development rather than relief sponsors, this 
study identified the following factors: (i) an absence of professional or education programmes 
targeting issues of reconstruction and development in the Gulf; (ii) discomfort with activities 
which are perceived as even slightly political; (iii) a perception that non-relief activities may 
be inappropriately invasive or disrespectful of recipient states’ sovereignty; and (iv) an 
overriding focus on high-profile and relatively inexpensive (on a per capita basis) 
humanitarian activities rather than low-profile, more costly and more effort-intensive 
development programmes. In sum, relief activities are technically simpler (though not 
cheaper), of shorter duration and less controversial than reconstruction and development,  
thus suggesting that Gulf state donors have, in some respects, chosen one of the relatively 
easier forms of donorship. 
4.4. International alignment, harmonization and coordination 
The Gulf states do not necessarily and, in many respects, should not measure themselves 
against the standards of OECD-DAC donor countries, which have routinely been criticized for 
their occasionally self-interested conditionalities and coercive relationships with many fragile 
states (Boyce 2002; Goodhand and Sedra 2007). However, the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (PDAE) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), two international conventions 
to which KSA and Kuwait (although not the UAE and Qatar) are signatories, provide a useful 
framework against which to assess the international alignment and effectiveness of Gulf state 
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donorship.35 The following is an admittedly brief analysis of Gulf state performance vis-à-vis 
the PDAE and AAA. 
4.4.1. Conditionalities and untying 
The Gulf states have remained exemplars in their aversion to conditionalities and ‘tying’ of aid 
– that is, setting conditions on the use of money or the purchase of aid-funded materials (such 
as from the donor country). Conditionalities and tying continue to be considered antithetical to 
Islamic principles of charity, which is rooted in the belief that assistance should be offered 
without ‘hidden agendas’, so often viewed as components of Western assistance (Barakat 
2005b; Jennings 2009). Those conditions which have been applied to Islamic aid, particularly 
during oil-price spikes in the late 1970s, involved relatively loose expectations rather than 
contractual obligations that assistance would be used primarily to finance oil purchases (Raffer 
and Singer 1996; Khaldi 1984). While some conditionalities pertaining to accountability may 
be useful in order to ensure that aid reaches its intended beneficiaries, particularly in the case 
of bilateral assistance, the lack of conditionalities and untied nature of Gulf state support is 
currently in line with the expectations of the PDAE and, in particular, the AAA. 
4.4.2. Ownership, alignment and use of country systems 
Ownership – recipient countries’ ability to control external assistance –remains another area of 
strength for the Gulf states. Bilateral support has been provided to an unprecedented level by 
these countries and, due to a lack of conditions or earmarking, has allowed high levels of 
ownership. Lebanon is a case in point, given that Gulf states generally worked to fulfil priority 
needs set by the High Relief Commission and the Lebanese government’s Council for 
Development and Reconstruction, according to numerous Lebanese officials and international 
aid actors interviewed by the authors. Furthermore, the reliance in other contexts on Red Cross 
and Red Crescent societies and UN agencies, which are responsive to recipients’ priorities,  
is also promising. 
Despite these existing strengths, alignment could be increased by greater engagement 
with local systems. The challenge of working closely with local institutions has increasingly 
                                                 
35 KSA and Kuwait have not, however, participated in surveys and other monitoring activities intended to chart 
their progress in implementing the PDAE. While the OECD-DAC Principles for Good International Engagement 
in Fragile States and Situations (2007) also present a starting point for assessing the contributions of the Gulf 
states to conflict-affected environments, they are relatively newer, having been endorsed in 2007; also, their 
relatively less technical focus on issues such as ‘do no harm’ and non-discrimination renders any assessment 
based on the presently available data challenging and lacking in credibility. 
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led Gulf state actors to operate independently and with little involvement of local civil  
society organizations or government bodies in war-torn environments. The development  
of humanitarian and development-oriented NGOs in Kuwait and Qatar, in particular, could  
be viewed as threatening local ownership if they result in a greater reliance on direct- 
execution models of implementation rather than partnerships with local organizations in 
conflict-affected contexts. Clearly the increasing enthusiasm for emergency response,  
post-crisis recovery and international development across the Gulf states must be met by  
an awareness of the missteps of a Western-dominated humanitarian community which has 
spent a significant portion of the past quarter-century working separately from, and far too 
frequently in parallel to, recipient governments. 
4.4.3. Harmonization or coordination 
The degree of coordination demonstrated by Gulf state donor institutions may be understood 
as either an internal process among Gulf states or as an external process concerning 
engagement with, in particular, OECD-DAC countries. The former topic has been an area  
of concern for the Arab Gulf states and has witnessed substantial progress since the founding 
in 1975 of the Coordination Group of Arab National and Regional Development Institutions, 
which is situated within the AFESD. Also involving the IsDB and the OFID, the Coordination 
Group has organized semi-annual meetings at which coordination is improved between 
bilateral as well as multilateral donor institutions in the Gulf. These meetings have also been 
accompanied by the standardization of, most notably, administrative procedures related to 
procurement (Coordination Group Secretariat 2008). 
On the other hand, levels of harmonization and coordination between OECD-DAC and 
Gulf state donors could have been described, at least before 2009, as weak to non-existent. In 
2009 coordination was improved through the organization of a major conference involving 
representatives of the OECD and all major Gulf state aid institutions; one outcome of this joint 
meeting was agreement for senior leadership of donor institutions to meet every two years and 
for technically oriented personnel to meet more frequently (Al-Hamad and Deutscher 2009). 
Despite such apparent progress, which is admittedly not unprecedented, it remains to be seen 
what tangible improvements in coordination will occur on the ground. Previous meetings have 
generated similar recommendations and agreements but, like the 2009 meeting in Kuwait, 
failed to result in systems or institutions capable of facilitating (let alone enforcing) promises 
of enhanced coordination. 
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The challenge of DAC–Gulf state coordination, which has diminished aid 
effectiveness, results in part from misperceptions between both sets of donors. As one US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) official in Beirut told the authors, ‘by the 
time we had assessed damage to a bridge, allocated the funds to rebuild it and found a suitable 
contractor, the Saudis or someone else had already repaired it’. Rather than congratulatory, 
such comments were often made with a degree of exasperation at both the wasted resources 
expended by the OECD-DAC donor and at the seemingly little preparation which Gulf states 
dedicated to complex projects. Western donor representatives expressed concerns that Arab 
donor organizations were willing to forego needs assessments, technical planning processes 
and even rudimentary accountability measures during procurement and disbursement. 
Conversely, Saudi and Kuwaiti officials, during interviews with the authors, indicated that 
they had hoped to coordinate on the ground with Western donors but found the international 
community overly concerned with security, procedure-orientated, pessimistic and overly 
comfortable with organizing events and meetings in luxurious surroundings which were 
deemed inappropriate, given the suffering taking place in conflict zones, according to 
representatives of the Saudi Popular Committee for Lebanese Relief. 
Both sides’ perceptions reflect a degree of truth, and it is apparent that trust building 
and joint planning must take place before crises strike, as well as once they have occurred. In 
future, in situations such as southern Lebanon, in which Gulf states are prepared to shoulder a 
large portion of the reconstruction enterprise, the international community may rightly allow 
them to take the lead rather than inviting them to UN-organized events. While there have been 
some improvements in coordination within the Gulf region – including by the Arab Group at 
the UN (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005) – efforts should be made to increase cooperation with 
the wider international community. Planning for donor conferences or coordination meetings 
should take place jointly, and emphasis should be placed on mutual capacity building  
and lesson-learning rather than a West-to-East transfer of ‘expertise’ premised on the 
superiority of the former. 
4.4.4. Results and mutual accountability 
From a programmatic perspective, the Gulf states have demonstrated relatively limited 
concern for the results or impact of their interventions (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005). No 
publicly available evaluation reports exist. Lakhdar Brahimi, who has collaborated with the 
Gulf states in Afghanistan and beyond, noted that they provide ‘little follow-up’ on their 
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financing and ‘rarely monitor’ the assistance which they provide. Kuwait is reported to be the 
most data-oriented of the Gulf state donors. Yet while it requires a ‘techno-economic 
feasibility study’ before considering loan applications and includes a Department of 
Information and Studies, impact monitoring and evaluation do not appear to be a key 
component of the Kuwait Fund’s project cycle (KFAED 2009). The Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development includes an evaluation department, although the Fund indicates that ‘evaluation’ 
refers to pre-approval studies and assessments rather than any follow-up examination of 
outcomes or impact (ADFD 2009). One might thus wonder how such institutions will be able 
to strengthen their operations and activities if, indeed, they are not aware which of their 
activities have worked, which have not and where improvements are possible and necessary.  
With such a limited amount of data regarding the interventions which they support, 
Gulf states’ donor agencies have little ability to provide upwards accountability to the 
governments which fund them or downward accountability to their beneficiaries. This lack of 
transparency has been linked by some to a traditional view of zakat, in which the giver is 
expected to provide assistance in good faith that the recipient will utilize it appropriately 
(Ayub 2008). According to such an understanding, the pursuit of accountability may be 
understood as an insult to recipients and as a sign of mistrust. Furthermore, the limited levels 
of government oversight and accountability are often viewed as extensions of the national 
political systems of most of the Gulf state donor countries, in which accountability is limited 
and is ultimately to the ruler. It appears evident, however, that enhanced attention to the 
measurement of results would be beneficial to improving aid effectiveness; and the Gulf states 
may be inclined to take the lead in articulating innovative approaches which foster 
accountability without undermining trust and respect between aid provider and aid recipient. 
4.4.5. Predictability 
With regard to predictability, the Gulf states have the greatest potential to improve. Pledged 
funds frequently fail to arrive, a common trend among all donors but which is particularly 
severe in the case of the Gulf states. The Saudi Fund, for instance, committed (not pledged) 
26.6 billion Saudi Riyals (US$7.1 billion) between 1975 at its inception and 2005, but 
disbursed 21.6 billion Riyals in the same period (US$5.8billion) (HIPC CBP 2009). Far more 
egregious examples of under-disbursement were noted in the case of post-2001 Afghanistan 
and post-2003 Iraq, where only minor portions of pledged funds were ultimately provided. As 
 42
a result of failed pledges, recipient governments and other donors are unable to plan their 
activities effectively in the critical months following crises. 
5. THE IMPACT OF GULF STATE ASSISTANCE 
The sheer volume and value of assistance make it likely that the Gulf states have had a 
significant effect on humanitarian well-being. In southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern 
suburbs following the July War, tens of thousands of people were able to rebuild their homes 
thanks to Gulf states’ compensation for damage (Barakat and Zyck 2008, Hamieh and Mac 
Ginty 2009). In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Gulf state support in the form of food, 
medicine, blankets, infrastructure repairs, basic education and agriculture allowed people  
to meet a greater proportion of their basic needs. Unfortunately, given Gulf states’ 
aforementioned lack of attention to results and accountability, measuring their impact in 
quantifiable terms according to outputs, outcomes and long-term effects is not possible. Their 
impact on state building, stabilization and regional cooperation can be observed, however, 
through a number of notable examples. Future studies – as well as evaluations – must be 
conducted in order to measure the overall effectiveness of their interventions regarding living 
conditions, including household incomes, food security, health and psychosocial well-being. 
5.1. State-building and stabilization 
While donorship may appear to be a primarily technical matter dealing with amounts, 
modalities, earmarking, programming, coordination and accountability, it is also closely tied 
in with conflict dynamics in recipient countries. The injection of resources from one country 
into another has significant ramifications for the populations and the governing institutions in 
conflict-affected contexts. Here, one may note two state-building implications of 
contemporary Gulf state donorship. 
First, as with all donors, funds channelled outside the state have the effect of 
undermining public institutions. If an NGO, for instance, delivers services with foreign 
funding, the state in the conflict-affected context will generally appear decreasingly significant 
in the provision of common goods. In some ways, with state legitimacy being defined and 
mediated by control of resources and provision of minimal well-being, large-scale Gulf state 
contributions directly to populations in other countries can erode the credibility of an already 
fragile post-conflict (or mid-conflict) state. While claims along these lines are by no means 
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Table 8. Attitudes towards housing compensation  
providers in southern Lebanon 
Attitudes 
towards 
Lebanese central 
governmentt 
Qatar 
                % % 
Better 4 56 
Worse  57 2 
Difference  –53 +54 
No change  38 42 
Source: Barakat and Zyck (2008), based on household surveys  
from August to October 2008. 
original (see Duffield 2001; Ghani et al. 2006, Lamb 2005), the authors have the advantage of 
empirical evidence from Lebanon.  
In Lebanon, surveys were used to gauge the effects of housing compensation providers 
on the population’s ‘attitudes toward’ the central government, key public agencies, non-state 
actors and foreign donors (Barakat and Zyck 2008). The results have significant implications 
for state-building. Respondents tended to view Qatar and Jihad al-Bina’a, an NGO reportedly 
supported by Iran, far more favourably as a result of their involvement in housing 
compensation, whereas public entities, particularly the Lebanese central government, were 
seen much more negatively (Table 8). More than half of respondents had a more critical 
attitude towards the central government due to its contribution to housing compensation, 
although the survey was admittedly unable to control for the influence of pre-existing political 
sentiments towards Lebanese state institutions (Barakat and Zyck 2008). 
The highly favourable view of Qatar, the donor which contributed the most per 
household to housing compensation, is understandable, and largely validates perceptions that 
humanitarian and development assistance, when done well and with flexibility, can be used as 
a tool of public diplomacy (Barakat 2005b). Yet such beneficial effects for countries such as 
Qatar may come at the expense of the Lebanese state. Respondents’ attitudes towards the 
Lebanese central state correlated directly with their level of interaction with the state and the 
amounts provided. Those who had received large compensation sums via Qatar, for instance, 
tended to have worse impressions of the central government, 70.1 per cent indicating that they 
viewed the state as worse (and none saying they viewed the state better) as a result of the 
housing compensation process. In contrast, only 27.8 per cent of those who had received 
assistance directly from the Lebanese government indicated that they viewed the state as 
worse due to its involvement (despite perceiving widespread corruption in the state-led 
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disbursement of assistance). While no approach to aid financing greatly improved the image  
of the Lebanese state, a by-product of centre–periphery divisions in the country, those which 
enabled greater state control over funds and a stronger role for public agencies in distributing 
assistance did less harm to the image of the state. 
Instances in which the Gulf states pledge assistance but fail to deliver funds also have 
significant implications for state-building. While promises of aid become well known in these 
countries, the failure to convert pledges into disbursements has been far more quietly handled. 
Populations thus expect aid which never arrives, leaving citizenries in these fragile 
environments to conclude that assistance was misappropriated if not outright stolen by the 
national government. The best illustration of this dynamic comes from Sa’ada, Yemen, an 
isolated region in which sporadic fighting has occurred since 2004 between the government 
and a Zaydi group commonly referred to as al-Houthi. Qatari offers of mediation in this 
conflict were intended to be accompanied by US$365 million in reconstruction financing in 
the event that a peace agreement was reached, according to interviews with officials from the 
government Sa’ada Reconstruction Fund (SRF). Such pronouncements were made publicly 
and shared with a grateful Yemeni population in Sa’ada. However, in 2008, when negotiations 
concluded and Qatari mediators departed without having achieved a peaceful settlement, few 
of the intended beneficiaries in Sa’ada or elsewhere in Yemen understood that the Qatari offer 
of US$365 million was simultaneously withdrawn. The population of Sa’ada, concluding that 
the Qatari aid had been received, became increasingly frustrated that new projects were not 
being initiated. According to Yemeni officials interviewed by the authors, local people 
concluded that the government and the SRF had used the monies for their own personal  
gain. Such tensions thus further strained relations between militants in northern Yemen  
and the central government, and an already protracted conflict appeared to become  
further entrenched (ICG 2009). 
In this Yemeni example one can also see a similar failure of Gulf state interventions in 
conflict-affected environments – a limited degree of conflict sensitivity. The notion of conflict 
sensitivity suggests that all activities in fragile environments be undertaken with an awareness 
of and appreciation for the existing or possible sources of conflict and conflict-causing 
tensions (Barbolet et al. 2005). With such awareness, donors, NGOs, UN agencies and others 
will, presumably, be able to plan and implement activities in a manner that either promotes 
stability or avoids exacerbating conflict vulnerability. This concept has been particularly 
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influential since the launch of Mary Anderson’s (1999) ‘Do No Harm’ project. The Western-
led aid establishment has increasingly viewed conflict sensitivity or conflict prevention as  
key components of programme design, implementation and monitoring (Conflict Sensitivity 
Consortium 2004). Yet it does not appear to have been reflected in the work of Gulf state 
donors. In addition to the aforementioned Yemeni example, Bosnia provides perhaps the most 
egregious example of conflict insensitivity. Mosque-building and rehabilitation were reported 
not only to upset large segments of the Bosniak population but also to raise fears among  
Serb and Croat communities (Schwartz 2002). Concerns that Islamic radicalism would be 
disseminated through Saudi agents and Saudi-funded mosques in Bosnia resulted in  
further complicating an already tense situation. As addressed in the conclusion of this  
paper, overcoming such missteps in the future should be viewed as a key priority for  
the Gulf state donors. 
Despite such problematic implications for state-building, it must be recognized that  
the Gulf states also engage with conflict-affected contexts outside the scope of their aid 
programmes. Such interactions are, at times, focused on supporting state-building, 
stabilization and institutional development. Most significant are loan guarantees and direct 
financial assistance to aid countries which are at risk of economic collapse or defaulting on 
their loans. Lebanon, the most heavily indebted country in west Asia and the fourth most 
heavily indebted globally, has received extensive financial assistance in order to ensure that 
the currency remains stable and the financial system avoids collapse. For instance, in 2006 
KSA deposited US$1 billion in Lebanon’s central bank in order to ‘prop up the exchange rate 
of the Lebanese pound’ (KUNA 2006). While such acts fall beyond the humanitarian or 
reconstruction focus of this study, it is apparent that the Gulf’s support to state-building is 
conceived in a manner far beyond its ODA. 
5.2. Regional integration 
It has also been hypothesized that Gulf state donorship may serve as a means of fostering 
increased regional integration throughout the Middle East. To assess the validity of this 
hypothesis, the authors considered the rate of contributions to Islamic or Middle Eastern 
multilateral funds and development banks. As is evident, the period since 2003 has been 
driven by a resurgence of support for these institutions (Figure 5). 
While one could conclude that the growth in ‘Arab agencies’, as the OECD labels 
them, has resulted from the US-led intervention in Iraq, such is not the case. Indeed, Burkina 
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Figure 5. Total ODA by multilateral ‘Arab agencies’, 1974–2007 
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Source: OECD ‘Stats’, Query Wizard on International Development Statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. 
Faso, Chad, Mali and Mozambique have been among the largest recipients of Arab 
multilateral support in the period from 2004 until the present. By 2008 the Saudi Fund’s 
cumulative loans to Africa were only 2.5 per cent lower than its cumulative loans to the 
Middle East and Asia (SFD 2009b) and included a $225 million loan to Sudan for the 
construction of the Merowe dam in the north of the country. While these loans are beyond the 
scope of this paper, given that most of the assisted countries tend to be relatively stable, this 
increase is astounding, and challenges Neumayer’s (2003a) claim, based on data up to 1997, 
that Arab agencies lend their greatest support to Arab and/or Islamic countries. It does not, 
however, seem to suggest that Gulf state donorship has necessarily led to improved regional 
cooperation among the Gulf states. 
Indeed, it is not uncommon for Gulf state institutions to operate simultaneously, yet in 
isolation from one another, in a single conflict-affected context. One could even argue that, as 
exemplified in the sequential manner in which the bilateral aid agencies formed in the Gulf 
states, that they are at times used as tools of regional one-upmanship or competition. One 
country’s achievement in the humanitarian sphere impels others to follow suit on a similar or 
greater scale where feasible. More recently, it appears that humanitarian and reconstruction 
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activities have also become integrated in a broader struggle among particular Gulf states (and 
other countries in the region) to position themselves as diplomatic heavyweights. 
The impact of Gulf states’ assistance appears, in sum, to have been largely 
indiscernible, although likely beneficial with regard to its immediate beneficiaries and 
somewhat corrosive or at least unbeneficial to state-building, conflict prevention and regional 
integration in the Gulf and the broader region. These effects appear to emerge from a view of 
humanitarian assistance as a tool of public and ‘deflective’ diplomacy and, at the same time, 
from a lack of appreciation for its impact on intangible elements of conflict vulnerability and 
state legitimacy. Despite these challenges, there remains much that so-called ‘traditional’ 
donors can learn from the Gulf states. 
6. CONCLUSION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR GULF STATE AND OECD-DAC DONORSHIP 
The Arab Gulf states have developed a novel approach to donorship in conflict-affected 
contexts from which many other donors, including those from the OECD-DAC, would benefit 
in examining further and, in some cases, replicating. Yet there also remain opportunities in 
which these Saudi, Kuwaiti, Emirati and Qatari institutions may learn from their peer 
institutions in the OECD-DAC. The goal of such experience-sharing and of this project would 
not, however, be to identify a constant and objective set of best practices for donorship in 
fragile and conflict-affected environments. The diversity of donor institutions and approaches 
enables would-be recipient organizations and government institutions to negotiate the best 
possible arrangements when seeking external assistance (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005). Aid 
seekers may court donors who are willing to provide assistance in achieving their priorities 
and with acceptable conditions and accountability mechanisms. These varied models ensure 
that no single donor or single approach to donorship attains a monopoly and presents state 
agencies and civil society in conflict-affected contexts with a ‘take it or leave it’ option. The 
following final two sub-sections, which comprise the conclusion to this paper, note those areas 
in which this diversity may be maintained while strengthening the work of all donors, 
including those in the OECD-DAC and in the Gulf. 
6.1. Gulf state innovations 
The Gulf states have innovated in a number of critical areas, at times by reverting to models 
long ago dropped by OECD-DAC donors, with their increasing sets of conditions and 
bureaucratic processes. The streamlined operating procedures within Gulf state institutions 
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have enabled them to respond quickly, particularly in the face of humanitarian emergencies. 
An increasing focus on cash compensation for losses suffered during conflict, as in Lebanon 
and partly in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, is one such manifestation of responsiveness. 
In addition to being swift, such methods also demonstrate the Gulf states’ value of the dignity 
of recipients – a concept commonly used but rarely pursued within Western aid circles –  by 
enabling them to determine what they need rather than imposing ill-suited assistance models 
developed in donors’ capitals.  
Gulf states’ aversion to invasive models of intervention which attempt to modify social 
relations or undermine customary sources of authority may also be understood as a form of 
respect for cultural autonomy, contrary to the external socio-political agendas frequently 
emphasized by Western donors. The sheer level of aid committed and disbursed by the Gulf 
states, particularly in contexts such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, is 
also noteworthy and merits replication by donor institutions in the West who have consistently 
fallen short of the UN-established aid target of 0.7 per cent of GDP. 
The Gulf states’ emphasis on respect for the dignity of individual beneficiaries of their 
assistance is also reflected in their engagement with recipient governments. As demonstrated 
within this study, the Gulf states have genuinely led the way in financing recipient public 
institutions rather than international and non-governmental implementing agencies in fragile 
and conflict-affected environments. The decision to do so is not merely a technical preference 
but reflects these donors’ understanding of the importance of government leadership in 
reconstruction. The large proportion of Gulf state aid flowing into the coffers of conflict-
affected states, almost exclusively without formal earmarking or conditionalities, also 
represents a clear argument in support of state sovereignty, a concept which has been under 
threat from OECD-DAC donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs, which have tended to 
bypass, ignore or, at times, marginalize the state. 
While challenges to state sovereignty have at times been fundamental in protecting 
human rights and preventing humanitarian crises, the Gulf states have demonstrated through 
their donorship that relief, reconstruction and development activities to mitigate fragility may 
require honouring sovereignty wherever feasible. 
6.2. Future strategies and options 
Despite these innovations and advantages, there remains room for Gulf state donorship to 
improve and, in select cases, learn lessons from their OECD-DAC peers. In addition to 
 49
funding states in conflict-affected environments, they may wish to consider a fuller form of 
engagement which helps to ensure that government institutions have the capabilities and 
systems in place to manage this aid effectively. Such engagement may include not only 
financial support but also attention to the development of institutions such as the High Relief 
Commission and Council for Development and Reconstruction in Lebanon or the MOPDC in 
Iraq. It will require a partial move away from purely financial or in-kind aid packages and 
greater reliance on technical assistance, which currently comprises less than one-tenth of 1 per 
cent of Gulf state assistance to the conflict-affected contexts included in this study (Table 7). 
Such assistance may be provided in the form of international advisers or, alternatively, 
extensive capacity-building activities perhaps oriented around elite civil service training 
centres to be established in the Gulf or in individual conflict-affected contexts. 
The presence of a cadre of well-trained civil servants within the Afghan, Iraqi, 
Lebanese or Palestinian governments could also ensure that ready-made partners exist on the 
ground to play a fuller role in designing, managing and monitoring programmes to be financed 
by KSA, Kuwait, the UAE or Qatar. Such a cadre would also be able to overcome issues 
relating to the operation and maintenance of Gulf-funded infrastructure projects, which have at 
times fallen into disrepair due to a lack of recipient government capabilities and buy-in. 
Further engagement with technical assistance and capacity building would also require 
that increased research on issues of conflict, fragility, humanitarian action, reconstruction and 
development is supported by the Gulf states. Doing so would also help to enable the staffs of 
Gulf state donor institutions to become further acquainted with the ‘soft’ elements of their 
work; for instance, SFD or the Kuwait Fund are home to experts in engineering and 
economics, but they do not necessarily possess the required level of in-house capacity for 
promoting conflict-sensitive approaches or participatory methods which empower 
communities (and counter aid dependency). A research and development unit either in the 
region or each Gulf state donor institution could allow such approaches to be learned, 
consolidated and systematically applied to the relief, reconstruction and development work 
being supported by KSA, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar. 
Steps may also be taken to ensure that Gulf state aid to conflict-affected environments 
has the greatest possible impact. Most notably, Gulf states may institute systems and processes 
to prevent the sorts of misappropriation which the authors (Barakat and Zyck 2008) found to 
have affected certain Gulf states’ assistance to housing rehabilitation in Lebanon in the 
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aftermath of the 2006 July War between Israel and Hezbollah. The Gulf states, particularly 
given their religious affinity with conflict-affected countries in the WANA region, may be 
able to approach increased financial accountability, not in the technocratic manner imposed by 
select OECD-DAC donors and international financial institutions (IFIs), but in a manner 
which represents recipients’ responsibility under Islam to ensure that not a penny intended for 
vulnerable populations is lost to inefficiency or corruption.  
For instance, communities which are scheduled to receive assistance from the Gulf 
states may be publicly informed of the amount which the Gulf state has provided for their 
reconstruction and development. Doing so may offer a form of visibility for the Gulf state 
donor country, while also enabling the local population to verify whether it has received an 
amount  approaching that which was intended by the donor. Increased transparency will 
naturally breed greater accountability (Weinar 2006). Despite such ‘soft’ approaches to 
accountability, it also appears somewhat unlikely that Gulf state aid will be used with 
increasing effect unless the states are willing to establish meaningful presences in conflict-
affected environments, a step which would also aid in the development of lasting partnerships 
with recipient institutions as well as with OECD-DAC donors. 
In addition to such financial accountability, the Gulf states would also be wise to pay 
increased attention to results-oriented accountability and the rigorous measurement of the 
impact of their activities within and beyond the scope of the aforementioned research and 
development unit. It will be fundamental for the Gulf states to understand what their funds 
have supported and what effect this aid has had on the well-being of recipients and on polities 
and economies of conflict-affected contexts. Measuring impact should not, however, focus 
strictly on technical outcomes and impacts but also on conflict vulnerability and the potential 
for renewed conflict or entrenched fragility. Greater attention to such dynamics might have 
been able to highlight, in advance of this study, the at-times negative influence that particular 
compensation schemes in Lebanon had on relations between the southern Lebanese population 
and the central government or the negative impact of large and unfulfilled aid pledges on 
places such as Yemen.  
In addition to strengthening the role of results-oriented accountability in their ongoing 
and future projects, the Gulf states may wish to learn lessons from past interventions by 
conducting or commissioning numerous ex-post evaluations; maintaining independence and 
impartiality in such evaluative work will require the mobilization of appropriately qualified 
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consultants or firms familiar with the local contexts, and should be prioritized in line with 
international standards and best practices. 
Aid effectiveness and conflict vulnerability may also be addressed, at least in part, 
through greater collaboration with civil society in recipient countries and through bridge-
building between local civil society and state institutions in countries in which the Gulf states 
operate. Here the Gulf states have the opportunity to collaborate with local, non-governmental 
partners in a manner which maintains their current focus on strengthening  state institutions  
in conflict-affected contexts. Such an outcome may be achieved not through direct-execution 
models common among OECD-DAC donors but by ensuring that recipient government 
institutions allocate Gulf state aid not only to their own agencies and personnel but also  
to non-government (as well as private-sector) institutions well placed to reach the  
intended recipients. 
Given that fragile or nascent states such as Afghanistan and Yemen, to name but two, 
have often suffered from centre–periphery divisions and mistrust, a delivery system which 
draws on civil society partners may be understood as yet another beneficial step in maximizing 
the impact of Gulf state aid. While Gulf states have also shown, particularly in Kuwait and 
Qatar, interest in developing home-grown international aid organizations, doing so may 
perhaps be viewed only as a secondary strategy to be considered, given the already crowded 
nature of the humanitarian sphere and high costs associated with international NGOs. 
Furthermore, donor institutions from the Gulf may also wish to re-conceptualize the 
manner in which they provide assistance by differentiating more fully between humanitarian 
relief and longer-term reconstruction and development. The former, which currently comprises 
a large proportion of Gulf state aid, may be delivered in a manner aligned with principles of 
zakat. These funds may be injected quickly and come with few strings attached pertaining to 
recipient reporting and accountability, thus ensuring that the funds are not overburdened by 
delays or bureaucratic procedures. 
Longer-term funding mechanisms which support reconstruction in conflict-affected 
contexts or sustainable development may be treated differently and, indeed, may be housed in 
distinctive institutions or sections of the Gulf states’ aid agencies. These funds may be 
accompanied by more stringent procedures, such as needs assessments, baseline studies and 
impact assessments, and may involve further requirements related to financial accountability 
from recipients. Furthermore, reconstruction and development financing may be more fully 
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recognized as an impetus to promote reforms or institutional development in beneficiary 
countries. For instance, donors financing large-scale infrastructure projects may reasonably 
require that recipient governments develop plans, institutions and financial mechanisms to 
ensure that funds are used appropriately and that Gulf state-funded projects are maintained 
long into the future. A transport project may hence not only require government approval for 
the project but also the development of an economic development or rural access strategy 
which shows the manner in which that government will ensure that its own spending and other 
donors’ projects make the best possible use of that transport investment from the Gulf. Each 
Gulf state should, however, determine the appropriate level of conditionalities for 
reconstruction and development projects according to their own comfort level and in line with 
the ability of recipient nations, particularly in conflict-affected contexts, to comply. The goal 
is not to make Gulf state donors indistinguishable from their OECD-DAC peer institutions but 
to ensure that KSA, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar do not enable their partners and recipients to 
approach development in a haphazard manner. 
Finally, Gulf states may wish to consider increased coordination with donors of the 
OECD-DAC as well as among themselves. In doing so, the Gulf states may be able to ensure 
greater harmonization between their programmes and those supported by other donor 
institutions in order to increase their combined effectiveness. Perhaps more importantly, 
coordination – which is ongoing through the AFESD-housed Coordination Group but has been 
subject to numerous false starts – would allow the Gulf states to demonstrate the comparative 
advantages of many of their approaches while learning lessons, such as those described above, 
from the experience of the OECD-DAC countries operating in fragile and conflict-affected 
environments. If such coordination is to be pursued, it must be based on greater mutual respect 
– again, both among Gulf state aid institutions and between the Gulf states and OECD-DAC 
donors – than currently appears to exist and must be preceded by a process of dialogue which 
overcomes misperceptions regarding one another’s modalities and priorities. 
Once coordination is achieved, one might see not only the strengthening of Gulf state 
donorship but also, perhaps, greater momentum for broader reform of the international aid 
system, based on the existing approaches of KSA, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar. These may 
help to ensure that donorship is more responsive, more closely attuned to local priorities 
(particularly in Islamic societies), increasingly sensitive to conflict dynamics and more 
supportive of the dignity and capacities of recipient states and populations. 
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAA   Accra Agenda for Action 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
AfDB  African Development Bank 
ADFD  Abu Dhabi Fund for Development 
AFTAAC Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African Countries 
AFESD Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
AGFUND Arab Gulf Fund for UN Development Organizations 
AMF  Arab Monetary Fund 
ARTF  Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
BADEA Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 
CAP  consolidated appeals process 
CRS  Creditor Reporting Service 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee 
DFID  UK Department for International Development 
DPA  Dayton Peace Agreement 
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council 
GNP  gross national product 
HIPC  highly indebted poor country 
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross 
IsDB  Islamic Development Bank 
IFI  International Financial Institution 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IOM  International Organization for Migration 
KFAED Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
KSA  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
LDCs  least developed countries 
LICs  low-income countries 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals  
MICs  middle-income countries 
MOPDC Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation 
NGOs  non-governmental organizations 
OAU  Organization of African Unity 
OCHA  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
ODA  official development assistance 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OFID  OPEC Fund for International Development 
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PDAE  Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
PECDAR Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction 
PFM  public financial management 
PNA  Palestinian National Authority 
QWIDS Query Wizard for International Development Statistics 
ROTA  Reach Out to Asia 
SFD  Saudi Fund for Development 
SRF  Sa’ada Reconstruction Fund 
UAE  United Arab Emirates 
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UNRWA UN Relief and Works Agency 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
VFBiH Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
WANA West Asia and North Africa 
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APPENDIX B: UNDERLYING DATA FOR FIGURES36 
Figure 1. Average annual OECD-DAC and Gulf state ODA, 1970–2007 
 1970–9 1980–9 1990–9 2000–7 
 US$ million 
DAC countries 125,042.88 330,359.83 558,129.88 627,917.40 
Gulf states, 
bilateral 
 
34,388.19 
 
44,409.45 
 
14,678.58 
 
15,232.14 
multilateral 3,008.03 2,067.16 1,089.43 1,814.23 
Gulf states, total 37,396.22 46,476.61 15,768.01 17,046.37 
 
                                                 
36 See in-text figures for information regarding data sources; limitations of available data are addressed in 
subsection 1.2, ‘Sources of information’, of the introduction. 
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Figure 2. OECD-DAC and Gulf state ODA, 1970–2007 
Year OECD-DAC 
ODA 
‘Arab’ 
countries’ ODA 
‘Arab’ 
agencies’ ODA 
Total ‘Arab’ 
ODA 
  
US$ million, 2009 constant 
‘Arab’ ODA as 
proportion of 
OECD-DAC 
ODA 
1970 6708.45 384.87 – 384.87 0.057370928 
1971 7278.78 437.94 – 437.94 0.060166676 
1972 8836.9 616.43 – 616.43 0.069756363 
1973 8697.47 2082.37 – 2082.37 0.239422499 
1974 11171.64 3752.81 116.72 3869.53 0.34637081 
1975 13239.03 5016.52 158.67 5175.19 0.390904016 
1976 13234.28 4343.56 412.32 4755.88 0.359360691 
1977 14935.95 4111.86 1101.24 5213.1 0.34903036 
1978 19127.46 6830.76 963.48 7794.24 0.407489546 
1979 21812.92 6811.07 255.6 7066.67 0.323967172 
1980 26155.97 9079.26 279.65 9358.91 0.35781162 
1981 24560.67 7794.98 399.53 8194.51 0.333643585 
1982 26956.88 5103.99 387.62 5491.61 0.203718309 
1983 26742.34 4209.42 313.02 4522.44 0.169111604 
1984 28089.95 3992.7 146.1 4138.8 0.147340953 
1985 28737.06 3237.56 127.46 3365.02 0.117096878 
1986 35803.85 4252.62 143.47 4396.09 0.122782606 
1987 40591.9 3230.7 72.46 3303.16 0.081374856 
1988 47009.11 1918.94 60.35 1979.29 0.042104392 
1989 45712.1 1589.28 137.5 1726.78 0.037775119 
1990 54285.79 5839.97 74.73 5914.7 0.108954848 
1991 58408.08 2428.82 153.12 2581.94 0.044205185 
1992 62346.48 1152.44 283.35 1435.79 0.023029207 
1993 56146.32 1144.54 184.01 1328.55 0.023662281 
1994 58803.07 905.91 257.22 1163.13 0.01978009 
1995 58780.97 640.93 21 661.93 0.011260957 
1996 55591.23 772.53 36 808.53 0.014544201 
1997 48462.19 739.68 37 776.68 0.016026515 
1998 52087.09 629.97 7 636.97 0.012228942 
1999 53218.66 423.79 36 459.79 0.008639639 
2000 53749.63 610.12 35.16 645.28 0.012005292 
2001 52421.8 690.47 145.16 835.63 0.015940506 
2002 58311.77 2654.62 140.04 2794.66 0.047926173 
2003 69064.2 2716.23 44.49 2760.72 0.039973242 
2004 79431.63 2076.45 283.55 2360 0.029711086 
2005 107077.66 1364.55 256.59 1621.14 0.015139853 
2006 104369.3 2501.48 447.93 2949.41 0.028259364 
2007 103491.41 2618.22 461.31 3079.53 0.029756383 
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Figure 3. Deviation of Gulf state ODA and crude oil price from 37-year average, 1970–2007 
Year Total ‘Arab’ ODA (US$ million, 
2009 constant) 
Mean crude oil price (per barrel) 
1970 384.87 $18.56  
1971 437.94 $18.88  
1972 616.43 $18.29  
1973 2082.37 $22.73  
1974 3869.53 $40.29  
1975 5175.19 $48.21  
1976 4755.88 $48.91  
1977 5213.1 $50.48  
1978 7794.24 $48.71  
1979 7066.67 $73.44  
1980 9358.91 $97.47  
1981 8194.51 $83.54  
1982 5491.61 $70.07  
1983 4522.44 $62.02  
1984 4138.8 $58.78  
1985 3365.02 $53.15  
1986 4396.09 $27.99  
1987 3303.16 $33.19  
1988 1979.29 $26.70  
1989 1726.78 $31.40  
1990 5914.7 $37.69  
1991 2581.94 $31.51  
1992 1435.79 $29.15  
1993 1328.55 $24.62  
1994 1163.13 $22.45  
1995 619.72 $23.35  
1996 736.17 $27.71  
1997 702.33 $24.67  
1998 622.23 $15.52  
1999 460.56 $21.12  
2000 645.28 $33.79  
2001 835.63 $27.59  
2002 2794.66 $26.94  
2003 2760.72 $31.97  
2004 2360 $42.35  
2005 1621.14 $54.01  
2006 2949.41 $61.37  
2007 3079.53 $64.93  
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Figure 4. Reported assistance from Gulf state interventions to select conflict-affected contexts, 
1999–2009 
 Afghanistan Bosnia Iraq Lebanon Palestinian 
Territories 
Yemen 
 US$ million (value at time of commitment) 
KSA 24.28 265.95 49.19 65.32 682.48 105.05  
Kuwait 3.45 – 28.55 21.00 114.95 –  
UAE 1.95 0.08 50.32 49.27 103.39 1.56  
Qatar – – 15.10 2.70 17.24 0.28  
Total 29.68  138.29 143.16 341.63 106.88 918.06 
Overall total 1,336.41 
 
Figure 5. Total ODA by ‘Arab agencies’, 1974–2007 
Year ‘Arab agencies’ 
 US$ million (2009 constant) 
1974 116.72 
1975 158.67 
1976 412.32 
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Figure 4. Reported assistance from Gulf state interventions to select conflict-affected contexts, 
1999–2009 
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